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Information system security literature has primarily focused on cognitive
processes and their impact on information security policy noncompliance behavior.
Specific cognitive theories that have been applied include planned behavior, rational
choice, deterrence, neutralization, and protection motivation. However, affective
processes may better determine misuse or information security policy noncompliance
than cognitive processes.
The purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate the impact of affective absorption
(i.e. the trait or disposition to become deeply involved with one’s emotions) and affective
flow (i.e. a state of deep involvement with one’s emotions) on cognitive processes in the
context of attitude toward and compliance with information security policies. In essence,
individuals with high levels of negative affective absorption may be more prone to
experience negative affective flow which may lead to deviant behavior such as misuse of
organizational information or noncompliance with information security policy.
The proposed conceptual model is evaluated using the classical experimental
design through a laboratory experiment. A preliminary investigation (e.g. expert panel

reviews, pre-test, and pilot studies) is conducted to ensure measurement validity. During
the main investigation, the proposed model and hypotheses are tested. Driven by theory,
an alternative model is proposed and tested.
The findings of this study underscore the need for understanding affective
processes with regard to information security policy compliance behavior. By evaluating
both cognitive and affective processes, we gain a more holistic understanding pertaining
to information security decision making. This study contributes to information systems
security literature by introducing two new constructs, affective absorption and affective
flow. In addition, it asserts the need to capture actual behavior in information security
research. The findings also contribute to practice by indicating that organizations should
(1) include affect in their security, education, training, and awareness programs, (2) focus
on eliminating frustrating tasks or reducing frustration caused by these tasks, and (3)
induce positive affect through monitoring employee affect levels, identifying areas that
need correction, and quickly responding to issues prior to deviance.

Keywords: Affect, affective absorption, affective flow, attitude, compliance,
future compliance intention, information security policy, negative affect, organizational
injustice
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Despite organizational efforts to deter abuse through information security
training, insider abuse is still an ongoing problem and is continually increasing; however,
59.1 percent of organizations still believe that losses are not due to malicious insiders (R.
Richardson, 2011). Considering that insiders have access privileges and intimate
knowledge of internal organizational processes (Willison & Warkentin, 2013), this is a
huge concern for organizations. How can organizations mitigate threats by keeping their
employees under control?
Prior literature in information systems security has primarily focused on cognitive
processes and their role in compliance with information security policies. Information
security policies define the security requirements employees should follow to maintain
the security objectives (i.e. confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability) of
an organization (Vroom & von Solms, 2004). Specific cognitive theories that have been
applied include rational choice, deterrence, neutralization, protection motivation, and
planned behavior. Despite the research devoted to reduce intentions to violate
information security policies, violations are still a grave concern for information security
management (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Q. Hu, Xu, Dinev, & Ling,
2011). This may be due to laziness, sloppiness, poor training, or lack of motivation
(Warkentin & Willison, 2009); however, there may be other factors that attribute to
1

noncompliance behavior. An additional factor for determining information security
attitudes, intention, and behavior may include affective processes.
Eagleman (2011) alarmingly states that “most of what we do and think and feel is
not under our conscious control…our brains run mostly on autopilot...almost the entirety
of what happens in [our] mental life is not under [our] conscious control.” Considering
that cognitions may not be completely controlled, affective processes may be more
important to understanding information security policy compliance behaviors. In fact,
affective processes are known to influence cognitive processes (Lerner & Keltner, 2000;
Loewenstein, 1996; Russell, 2003). By evaluating affective processes, we can have a
more holistic understanding of information security compliance behaviors. In this
dissertation, I specifically evaluate the impact of affective absorption (i.e. the trait or
disposition to become deeply involved with one’s emotions) and affective flow (i.e. a
state of deep involvement with one’s emotions that leads to the belief that nothing else
matters) on cognitive processes in the context of attitude toward and compliance with
information security policies.
The remaining of this chapter discusses the importance of both affective and
cognitive processes and their relationship with information security policy compliance
behavior. Next, it presents the research objective with its associated conceptual research
model. Then, it describes the method for empirically testing the research model. Finally,
it concludes by describing the significance of this study.
A case of cognition vs. affect
Cognitive appraisals are explained by theories such as the theory of planned
behavior, rational choice theory, deterrence theory, and neutralization theory. The theory
2

of planned behavior predicts that attitudes will lead to intentions and intentions will lead
to behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). According to rational choice theory,
before engaging in behavior, people weigh the costs and benefits of a specific behavior
and try to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs before taking action (D’Arcy &
Herath, 2011; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Westland, 1997). To better influence these
“rational” decisions, deterrence theory explains that organizations establish policies and
procedures that highlight the severity, certainty, and celerity of punishment for abuse.
Therefore, the cost of noncompliance is greater than the benefits and so the abuse is
deterred (Onwudiwe, Odo, & Onyeozili, 2005). Despite the deterrence mechanisms in
place, neutralization theory states that individuals may rationalize their behavior through
various justification techniques in order to reduce their view of the consequences (Sykes
& Matza, 1957). Even though these theories have been proven useful in explaining
information security attitudes, intentions, and behaviors, they may not fully capture the
relationships that lead to noncompliance behavior.
Consider the situation in which John needs some additional money in order for a
family member to receive much needed medical attention. An opportunity presents itself
where he discovers a way to scam his organization for the needed money and cover his
tracks. Based on rational choice theory, John would cognitively weigh the benefits and
the costs of misuse or noncompliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Westland, 1997). If he
perceives that the benefits outweigh the costs, he might act against his organization to
obtain the needed money. Cognitively, he would begin reconnaissance (e.g. gathering
information about the victim), scan for vulnerabilities, exploit a weakness, and cover his
tracks (Kratt, 2004). However, John may remember his moral commitment to the
3

organization or he may recognize the organizational sanctions that would occur if he
were caught. Based on the given situation, John may choose not to exploit the company’s
weakness.
Extending this example a little further, John may still choose to scam the
company if he experiences negative emotions caused by the organization. Let’s assume,
at the same time this opportunity of misuse presented itself, John was actively working
towards an open position within the company and, if promoted, he would have the needed
money. After waiting to hear back about the position, he learns the position was filled
from outside the organization, he was not given an opportunity to interview, and he
received no response regarding his application. Despite the cognitive processes that may
have deterred John from committing misuse, he experiences a strong bout of anger and
decides to scam the company. How could John’s corporation have deterred this abuse?
Focusing on affective processes in addition to cognitive processes may provide the
answer. Individuals deeply attached to their current emotions may discount or even
neglect cognitive processes associated with information security policy compliance
behavior.
Affect is an umbrella term for moods, emotions, or feelings (Bagozzi, Gopinath,
& Nyer, 1999; Russell, 2003; P. Zhang, 2013) which is influenced by everyday
experiences. Particularly, familial relationships, work relationships, or even diet have an
impact on one’s general affect (Jones, 2013; J. J. Kim, Park, & Baskerville, 2012;
Willison & Backhouse, 2006). A person (e.g. John), who continues to experience events
that induce negative affect, may become completely engaged with these emotions. A
person in this state may perceive time to pass slowly, exist in a state of perpetually
4

increasing anger, and say or do things they normally would not say or do (i.e. negative
affective flow). Considering the previous example, John’s affective flow ultimately led to
his decision to violate established organizational policies and procedures. Therefore,
recognizing when employees are in an emotional state of flow is essential for
organizations to protect against abuse.
Research objective
Extensive information security research has evaluated cognitive processes and
their relationship to information security compliance behavior (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, &
Benbasat, 2008; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Siponen & Vance,
2010). Although cognitive processes are critical to understanding why employees do not
comply with policies and procedures, they do not completely explain motivations of the
abusive insider. Affective processes are necessary and important components of rational
decision making (Djamasbi, Strong, & Dishaw, 2010) and often influence cognitive
processes such as judgments and decisions (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). In fact, emotions
have been shown to influence all forms of behavior and this influence is proportionate to
the level of emotions (Loewenstein, 1996). Additionally, strong emotions may lead
individuals to behave contrary to self-interests (Willison & Warkentin, 2013) because
they become deeply involved with their emotions. Furthermore, individuals that perceive
they have been treated unfairly by their organization are likely to experience strong
emotions as fairness perceptions directly or indirectly influences people’s emotions
(Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). This rational leads to my primary research questions:
RQ1: Does cognition or affect have a greater influence on information security
compliance attitudes and behaviors?
5

RQ2: Do perceptions of unfairness cause individuals to experience a deep level of
involvement with their emotions?
RQ3: Does a deep level of involvement with emotions influence attitudes toward and
compliance with information security policies?
Conceptual research model
Based on the evaluation of existing literature and theoretical frameworks, I have
developed a conceptual research model to answer the previous research questions (see
Figure 1.1). In this model, I identify relationships of cognitive and affective processes in
an information systems security context. Ultimately, I seek to determine the influence of
both cognitions and affect on information security policy attitude and compliance
behavior. This model suggests that organizational injustice (distributive, procedural,
informational, and interpersonal injustice) directly influences the state of negative
affective flow. In addition, negative affective absorption is postulated to have a direct
relationship on negative affective flow. Organizational injustice, negative affective flow,
and attitude toward general information security policy are predicted to determine
attitude toward specific information security policy. Finally, organizational injustice,
negative affective flow, and attitude toward specific information security policy is
expected to influence compliance with information security policy. See Table 1.1 for a
list of constructs with their definitions and sources.
Since internal users continue to be the greatest threat to organizational
information and assets (Warkentin & Willison, 2009; Willison & Warkentin, 2013),
establishing information security policies and ensuring compliance with these policies is
vital to organizational operations. Information security policies define the security
6

requirements employees should follow to maintain the security objectives (i.e.
confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of an organization (Vroom & von Solms,
2004). Various studies have examined the best procedures to create and effectively apply
these policies to encourage information security policy compliance behavior (Puhakainen
& Siponen, 2010; Siponen & Iivari, 2006; Siponen, 2000; Warkentin, Johnston, &
Shropshire, 2011; Warkentin & Johnston, 2006), but policy violations continue to be a
grave concern. To better understand why these violations still occur, we need to
understand the role of both cognition and affect in information security policy
compliance behavior.

Figure 1.1

Conceptual model

7

Table 1.1

Definition and source of constructs

Variable
Distributive
injustice
Procedural
injustice
Interpersonal
injustice
Informational
injustice
Negative
affective
absorption
Negative
affective flow
Attitude toward
general
information
security policy
Attitude toward
specific
information
security policy
Information
security policy
compliance

Definition
The ratio of work outputs (rewards) and input
(contributions) to the ratio of a comparative
other are perceived to be unfair.
The perceived unfairness of the process by
which the outcomes were achieved.
The degree to which people are not treated with
politeness, dignity, and respect by decision
makers.
The extent that the explanations provided do not
sufficiently convey the reasoning behind
processes and outcomes.
The trait or disposition to become deeply
involved with one’s negative emotions.

Definition Source
Adams (1965) &
Willison and
Warkentin (2013)
Cohen-Charash and
Spector (2001)
Turel, Yuan, and
Connelly (2008)
Turel, Yuan, and
Connelly (2008)
Developed for this
study.

The state of deep involvement with one’s
Developed for this
emotions that leads to the belief that nothing else study.
matters.
Relatively enduring beliefs and predispositions Ajzen (1991);
(favorable or unfavorable) towards all
Scherer (2005);
information security policies.
Herath and Rao
(2009b)
Relatively enduring beliefs and predispositions Ajzen (1991);
(favorable or unfavorable) towards a specific
Scherer (2005);
information security policy.
Herath and Rao
(2009b)
An employee’s actual behavior to protect the
Adapted from Bulgurcu
information and technology resources of an
et al. (2010) definition
organization from potential security breaches. of compliance intention

Additionally, the role of cognition and affect on attitudes may also influence
behavior. Previous literature across multiple disciplines has repeatedly shown that
attitudes determine intention and intention determines behavior. In the context of
information security, attitudes have been shown to impact behavioral information
security intention and behavior (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Hosack,
Twitchell, & Sagers, 2009; Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 2007; Warkentin et al., 2011).
8

Attitude toward information security policy is defined as the relatively enduring beliefs
and predispositions towards information security policies (Ajzen, 1991; Herath & Rao,
2009b; Scherer, 2005). Considering that attitude is influenced by both cognition and
affect (Ajzen, 1991; Brown, Fuller, & Vician, 2004; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Gao &
Koufaris, 2006; Igbaria & Parasuraman, 1989; Jiang & Benbasat, 2007; Moon & Kim,
2001; Siponen & Vance, 2010; Willison & Warkentin, 2013; P. Zhang & Li, 2007), both
aspects need to be explored to better understand information security policy attitudes,
compliance intention, and actual compliance behavior.
Cognitive reactions to work-related activities are explained by various theories:
(1) the theory of planned behavior – attitudes determine intention and intention
determines behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Herath & Rao, 2009b); (2)
rational choice theory – people behave based on decisions where the benefits of an action
exceed its cost (D’Arcy & Herath, 2011; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Westland, 1997);
(3) deterrence theory – negative behaviors are deterred by the severity, certainty, and
celerity of a given punishment (Beccaria, 1963; Bentham, 1781; D’Arcy & Herath, 2011;
Onwudiwe et al., 2005); and (4) pre-kinetic events – work-related events that occur prior
to abuse usually as an outcome of neutralization, organizational injustice, expressive
motives, and disgruntlement (Willison & Warkentin, 2013).
In the case of organizational injustice, negative work-related events influence
feelings, attitudes, and behavior (Aquino, Lewis, & Bradfield, 1999; Cohen-Charash &
Spector, 2001; Greenberg, 1990). Depending on the level of injustice experienced, an
individual may experience high-intensity emotions which influence cognitive processes
and behavior (Judge, Scott, & Ilies, 2006; J. J. Kim et al., 2012; Lee & Allen, 2002;
9

Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Loewenstein, 1996; Willison & Backhouse, 2006). Intense
levels of negative affect may result in people becoming deeply involved with their
negative emotions (i.e. negative affective flow). In this study, negative affective flow is
expected to be a driving force for attitudes and behavior.
Research method
The dependent variable in this study is actual behavior because measuring actual
behavior is much more valuable than collecting behavioral intention while exploring
phenomena related to information security (C. L. Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Crossler et
al., 2013; Mahmood, Siponen, Straub, Rao, & Raghu, 2010; Straub, 2009; Warkentin,
Straub, & Malimage, 2012). In order to empirically test the behavior of respondents, a
laboratory experiment was created that incorporated the classical experimental design
(see Chapter III). The treatment in this design is used to induce continued negative affect
in the subjects to determine the influence of negative affective flow on attitude towards
and compliance with information security policy.
In order to establish content and construct validity, the laboratory experiment was
refined through expert panel reviews, a pretest, and pilot studies prior to full data
collection. By conducting these preliminary procedures, common method bias is reduced
(Burton-Jones, 2009; Petter, Straub, & Rai, 2007; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, &
Podsakoff, 2003; Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004) and instrument validity is increased
by ensuring reliability and convergent and discriminant validity meet expected cutoffs
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000;
Gefen & Straub, 2005; Mackenzie, Podsakoff, & Podsakoff, 2011; Nunnally & Bernstein,
1994; Peter, 1981; Straub et al., 2004).
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The participants for this study were recruited from undergraduate students from
various departments in the College of Business at Mississippi State University. This
population is deemed as an appropriate sampling frame because students are subject to
emotions, moods, and feelings and are expected to abide by university security policies.
The findings of this study should be generalizable to a greater population including
organizational employees because they experience similar emotions and are expected to
abide by organizational information security policies.
Significance of the study
Organizations understand that protecting their information is vital to business
operations. For example, until recently, Google kept their $600 million Lenoir data center
which houses 49,923 servers completely secret except to a few privileged employees
(Levy, 2012). An event where information systems software and hardware are negatively
affected could ultimately destroy an organization. Accordingly, organizations need to
have the safeguards in place to deter, prevent, detect, and remedy security breaches
(Straub & Welke, 1998). However, the theories that explore cognitive reasoning such as
theory of planned behavior, rational choice theory, and deterrence theory do not
completely address abuse-related issues. Willison and Warkentin (2013) indicate that
reasons for abuse may be due to pre-kinetic events (e.g. neutralization, organizational
injustice, disgruntlement, or expressive motives). These pre-kinetic events may influence
affective processes in addition to cognitive processes.
This study underscores the need for understanding affective processes with regard
to information security policy compliance behavior. Through evaluating both affective
processes and cognitive processes in information security decision making, we may have
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a more holistic understanding pertaining to compliance with organizational security
policies. Both academics and practitioners can benefit from this holistic understanding.
This research contributes to theory by introducing two new constructs, affective
absorption and affective flow, which can be used to explore other behaviors and its
influence on other cognitive processes. In addition, information systems researchers can
further investigate additional factors that influence this state of affective flow. Also,
affective flow is a critical pre-kinetic event to examine prior to deterrence.
This research contributes to practice because it indicates factors that influence
affective reactions. Organizations can ensure that their employees are content by
proactively treating them fairly and rewarding them emotionally. In addition, in the case
that an employee experiences negative affect due to perceptions of organizational
injustice or to other work-related events, this research identifies how organizations could
address sensitive issues prior to the development of a state of negative affective flow. For
example, organizations can survey employee affect to address sensitive issues respectably
and courteously prior to any resulting deviant behavior.
Organization of the study
This research is organized into five chapters with appendices. In this first chapter,
I introduced this study by defining the problem area and describing the scope of this
research. Additionally, I highlighted research questions and discussed potential
contributions of this study.
In Chapter II, I reviewed current literature related to information security policy
compliance behavior, the role of cognition on information security policy compliance
behavior, and the role of affect on information security policy compliance behavior
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including the introduction of two new constructs (i.e. affective absorption and affective
flow). Then, I presented my conceptual research model and discussed the related research
hypotheses.
Chapter III outlined the methods used to empirically test my conceptual model.
First, I briefly defined the variables used in this study, discussed adaptation of items from
prior literature, introduced items for newly developed constructs, and described the
instrument for collecting data. Next, I detailed the flow of a two-phase investigation: (1)
beginning with a preliminary investigation, I conducted expert panel reviews, a pretest,
and pilot studies to ensure validity and reliability of items, and, (2) as part of the primary
investigation, I described the experimental design, procedure, and sampling frame used
for data collection.
Chapter IV analyzes the data collected for this study and presents the results and
research findings.
Chapter V concludes and summarizes this study. Implications for researchers and
practitioners are presented. Additionally, limitations to this study are discussed and future
research opportunities are suggested.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW, MODEL, AND HYPOTHESES

Human behavior can often be unpredictable insomuch that employees who are
generally considered to be honest and hardworking may violate security policies. The
purpose of this study is to determine what may lead to these unpredictable security
violations, specifically examining the influence of affect (e.g. feelings, emotions, moods)
on information security policy compliance behavior. This chapter begins by defining
information security policy compliance, then it discusses the role of cognition in
information security policy compliance behavior, next it describes the role of affect in
information security policy compliance behavior, and finally it proposes the conceptual
model and hypotheses to be tested.
Information security policy compliance
Establishing mandatory security requirements is vital to protecting organizational
assets. Although external threats to organizations are continually growing due to the
globalization of information systems, the greatest threat often lies internally (Warkentin
& Willison, 2009; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Internal users already have been granted
some degree of authorization to certain systems; therefore, they are trusted to operate
legally and ethically with these systems. However, the weakest link in a network is said
to be “between the keyboard and the chair” (Warkentin & Willison, 2009). Considering
14

that these users are already within the organization’s perimeter defenses, a possible rogue
employee could be disastrous for an organization if insufficient security controls were in
place.
One form of controls is to deter individuals by establishing information security
policies. These policies define the security requirements of an organization by detailing
the processes and procedures employees should follow to maintain the security objectives
of an organization: confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and assets
(Vroom & von Solms, 2004). For these policies to be effective, organizations need to
focus on increasing employee awareness of the policy (D’Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009;
Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). For example, instructing individuals of the benefits and
risks involved in creating secure passwords or locking their workstation could help users
achieve the security objectives of the organization.
Prior literature has guided the construction and effective application of these
policies to encourage information security policy compliance behavior (Puhakainen &
Siponen, 2010; Siponen & Iivari, 2006; Siponen, 2000; Warkentin et al., 2011;
Warkentin & Johnston, 2006). Nevertheless, due to laziness, sloppiness, poor training, or
lack of motivation, internal users may fail to “protect the integrity and privacy of the
sensitive information of the organization and its partners, clients, customers, and others”
(Warkentin & Willison, 2009). For this reason, researchers have devoted a substantial
amount of attention to compliance with information security policy by exploring
antecedents to information security policy compliance intention and information security
policy compliance behavior. Some examples include the benefit of compliance, cost of
compliance, cost of noncompliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010), attitudes, normative beliefs,
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habits (Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007a, 2007b), perceived certainty and severity of
sanctions, threat appraisal, coping appraisal, response cost (Herath & Rao, 2009b),
organizational culture, individual beliefs (Q. Hu, Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012), rational
choice calculus (Q. Hu et al., 2011), perceived justice of punishment, punishment
expectancy (Xue, Liang, & Wu, 2010), neutralization techniques (Siponen & Vance,
2010), and self-efficacy (Warkentin et al., 2011). Despite the attention devoted to
information security policy compliance behavior, policy violations – the use of computers
against established rules and policies for personal gain – remain a top concern of
information security management (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Q. Hu et al., 2011).
For this reason, researchers have explored various factors that lead to policy
violations. According to dual-process theory, a “rational thinking failure” such as a policy
violation is explained by two competing human reasoning systems (Neys, 2006).
Although these reasoning systems come in many flavors, in this study, the phenomenon
of information security policy compliance behavior is evaluated based on competing
cognitive and affective processes. Therefore, in order to fully understand why
information security policy violations still occur, we need to understand the role of both
cognition and affect in information security policy compliance as they both influence
decision-making.
The role of cognition in information security policy compliance
Cognition plays a major role on people’s intention and behavior. Therefore, it is
important to understand what cognitive processes may influence information security
policy compliance behavior. Several theories that describe individual cognitive processes
are defined and serve as the foundation for the research model in this study. These
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theories describe the evolution of cognition as it relates to information security policy
compliance behavior. Said theories include the theory of planned behavior, rational
choice theory, deterrence theory, and pre-kinetic events such as neutralization theory and
organizational injustice.
Theory of planned behavior
The theory of planned behavior, an extension of the theory of reasoned action,
explains that an individual’s intentions ultimately lead to his or her behavior (Ajzen,
1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Both the theory of planned behavior and the theory of
reasoned action predict that attitude toward the behavior and subjective norms lead to
intention; however, the theory of planned behavior extends the theory of reasoned action
through the inclusion of a third variable, perceived behavioral control (see Figure 2.1;
Ajzen, 1991). Attitude toward the behavior is the degree of favorability toward the
behavior in question. Subjective norm is the degree of social pressure to perform the
given behavior. Perceived behavioral control is the degree of difficulty to perform the
behavior based on past experience and possible impediments or obstacles. Additionally,
the theory of planned behavior distinguishes between behavioral, normative, and control
beliefs and how they relate to attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral
control, respectively. Although the theory of planned behavior is effective in explaining
user intentions and behavior, other theories offer additional explanations for intention and
behavior.
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Figure 2.1

Theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991)

Rational choice theory
One alternative explanation of intention and behavior is rational choice theory
which evaluates criminal behavior. The central idea behind rational choice theory is that
people weigh the costs and benefits of a specific behavior and try to maximize the
benefits and minimize the costs before taking action (D’Arcy & Herath, 2011;
Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Westland, 1997). Paternoster and Pogarsky (2009) further
expand this definition by identifying four steps to rational decision making: (1) recognize
alternatives to achieving some goal, collect information about each alternative, and
identify the costs and benefits to each alternative, (2) consider and compare the costs and
benefits of these alternatives, (3) choose an alternative based on previous consideration,
and (4) evaluate the decision later for possible improvement.
Even though rational choice theory has been useful in explaining behavior, it is
widely criticized due to the subjective nature of decisions. Depending on both the
preferences of an individual and the decision itself, the costs and benefits of a decision
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vary (Paternoster & Pogarsky, 2009; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Ultimately, people
will make choices according to their preferences. For instance, unethical or unlawful
individuals may believe their choice was “rational” even if law-abiding citizens would
disagree.
Deterrence theory
Considering that these “rational” choices may threaten organizational systems and
information, establishing proper controls may effectively mitigate some of these threats.
In response to rational choice theory, deterrence theory has been explored as a way to
increase the costs of abuse in attempt to divert such behavior.
According to the security action cycle (Straub & Welke, 1998), four stages should
be evaluated to ensure system and information security: deterrence, prevention, detection,
remedies (see Figure 2.2). First, organizations try to dissuade abuse (e.g. sanctions).
Where deterrence is unsuccessful, proper safeguards should be in place to prevent misuse
or noncompliance (e.g. access controls). When prevention techniques are ineffective,
systems and procedures should be in place to detect the threat (e.g. intrusion detection
systems). Finally, should detection fail, remedies should be in place to restore systems,
data, or information to their original form (e.g. data backup). In order to address all these
stages adequately, companies can produce a countermeasure matrix to determine the best
viable option for the company to take in order to deter, prevent, detect, and remedy abuse
(Straub & Welke, 1998).
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Figure 2.2

Security action cycle (Straub & Welke, 1998)

The first stage of this cycle indicates the importance of deterrence. If potential
abusers can be deterred from committing misuse, then there is no need for the later
stages. Nevertheless, this is not always a realistic possibility. Instead, as threats are
prevented, detected, and remedied, lessons learned in these later stages can be applied to
enhance the deterrence stage through deterrence feedback. In essence the idea of the
security action cycle is to maximize deterrents through the use of sanctions. However,
companies need to be careful when exacting punishment because they would be
unjustified to have a punishment in excess of what is essential to deter violations
(Onwudiwe et al., 2005).
Deterrence research has focused on three forms of sanctions to deter misuse:
formal sanctions, informal sanctions, and shame (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001; Siponen &
Vance, 2010). Formal sanctions consist of ramifications that are imposed by formal
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institutions, organizations, and governments (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). Informal
sanctions include the disapproval of coworkers, friends, family, and others for a given
action (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Shame, a self-imposed sanction, occurs when
individuals perform acts that are a violation of their moral beliefs (Hovav & D’Arcy,
2012; Siponen & Vance, 2010).
Deterrence theory further states that “if punishment is severe, certain, and swift, a
rational person will measure the gains and losses before engaging in crime and will be
deterred from violating the law if the loss is greater than the gain” (Onwudiwe et al.,
2005). Essentially, this statement identifies three components of deterrence theory (see
Figure 2.3): perceived sanction severity, perceived sanction susceptibility, and perceived
sanction celerity (D’Arcy & Herath, 2011; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Onwudiwe et al., 2005;
Straub & Welke, 1998). Perceived sanction severity pertains to the strength of the
punishment if an individual were caught, perceived sanction certainty pertains to the
likelihood an individual will be caught, and perceived sanction celerity pertains to the
speed an individual will be caught. These constructs relate to each other in that they all
focus on central aspects of deterring abuse and/or noncompliance.

Figure 2.3

Deterrence theory
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Although each of the sanctions have been shown to affect behavioral intent,
research has either excluded one dimension or demonstrated conflicting results. For
instance, perceived sanction celerity is often excluded from research studies because of
its difficulty of measurement and the lack of significance (D’Arcy & Herath, 2011).
Additionally, when comparing and contrasting the research such as D’Arcy, Hovav, &
Galletta (2009) and Herath & Rao (2009), perceived sanction severity had an impact on
compliance in one study but not in the other study; however, in these same studies the
opposite was true for perceived sanction certainty. Also, abuse still occurs even though
evidence exists that abusers may be caught quickly and punished severely. These and
other similar discrepancies may indicate alternative explanations to behavior other than
deterrence theory. In order to address these issues, Willison and Warkentin (2013)
explain an individual’s thought process by extending the original security action cycle to
include pre-kinetic events, events that occur prior to deterrence (see Figure 2.4). One of
these pre-kinetic events that has recently received a lot of attention in information
security research is neutralization theory.
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Figure 2.4

Extended security action cycle (Willison & Warkentin, 2013)

Neutralization theory
Although sanctions may motivate individuals to comply with information security
policies, Siponen and Vance (2010) successfully demonstrated that neutralization theory
may predict misuse better than sanctions deter misuse. Neutralization theory states that
individuals rationalize their behavior through various justification techniques in order to
reduce their view of the consequences (Sykes & Matza, 1957). These techniques have
even been applied in non-criminal rule-breaking actions (Pershing, 2003). For example, a
person may justify his or her behavior by stating, “I have been a good employee during
my employment with this company, I can justify sharing my password this one time” or
“if I don’t share my password, our project will not finish on time.”
During the past half century, research has examined several neutralization
techniques individuals may use, despite the sanctions in place, to violate information
security policy. The original five neutralization techniques were defined by Sykes and
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Matza (1957). Recently, Willison & Warkentin (2013) identified 17 different
neutralization techniques used by individuals. In this current study, the list has since been
expanded to 19 techniques. Table 2.1 includes a list of each technique with its definition,
an example, and its sources. Considering the wide array of rationalizations employees
may use to justify noncompliance with information security policy, it is important to
understand what influences these rationalizations to participate in deviant behavior. Other
sources of influence may originate from additional pre-kinetic events such as
organizational injustice, disgruntlement, or expressive motives (Willison & Warkentin,
2013).
Table 2.1

Neutralization techniques

Technique
Denial of
responsibility

Definition
Example
Offenders perceive themselves as
I didn’t mean
victims of their environment, therefore, it.
they feel they lack responsibility for
their deviant actions.
Denial of injury Offenders perceive their behavior has no I didn’t really
direct harmful consequences to the
hurt anybody.
victim.
Denial of the
Offenders perceive that the injury isn’t They had it
victim
really an injury but rather a form of
coming.
rightful retaliation or punishment.
Condemnation of Offenders shift focus to those who
The system is
the condemners disapprove of their acts. They feel those corrupt.
who condemn them are hypocritical.
Appeal to higher Offenders believe they are following
I didn’t do it
loyalties
higher moral values than those of the
for myself.
people judging.
Metaphor of the Offenders rationalize that they have
I have done
ledger
done enough good deeds to justify a
enough good.
little bad.
Claim of
Offenders reduce guilt feelings or justify Everybody
normality/
behavior by arguing that the behavior in does it.
Diffusion of guilt question is common.
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Source
Sykes & Matza
(1957); Henry
(2009)
Sykes & Matza
(1957); Henry
(2009)
Sykes & Matza
(1957); Henry
(2009)
Sykes & Matza
(1957); Henry
(2009)
Sykes & Matza
(1957); Henry
(2009)
Henry (2009);
Siponen & Vance
(2010)
Henry (1989;
2009); Cromwell
& Thurman
(2003)

Table 2.1 (Continued)
Denial of
negative intent
Claim of relative
acceptability

Offenders claim they did not intend the It was just a
Henry (1989;
negative outcome.
joke.
2009);
Offenders compare questioned behavior There are
Henry (1989;
with other deviant behavior that is more worse people 2009);
serious arguing that it is acceptable by than me.
being less harmful or less serious.
Claim of
Offenders believe that because of a
I work hard so Coleman (1994);
entitlement
major investment of energy, risk, or
I deserve it.
Henry (2009)
courage on their part they deserve
deviant rewards as compensation.
Claim of
Offenders participate in deviant behavior I don’t care
Henry & Eaton
individuality
regardless of the opinion of others.
what anyone (1989); McGregor
else thinks.
(2008)
Defense of the Offenders feel they have no choice
I had no other Minor (1981);
necessity
under the circumstances but to engage in choice.
Cromwell &
certain behavior.
Thurman (2003)
Denial of the
Offenders feel the law in question is not We don’t need Coleman (1994);
necessity of the fair as it infringe on the rights of
laws for this McGregor (2008)
law
citizens.
behavior.
Avoidance of
Offenders argue that changes advocated It would only Garrett et al.
greater harm
by the accusers would cause more harm make things
(1989)
than good.
worse.
Legal rights
Offenders argue their actions are
I didn’t break Garrett et al.
justified because it is legally acceptable. the law.
(1989)
Comparative
Offenders believe they shouldn’t be
Others have got Garrett et al.
standards
singled out for persecution when others away with it. (1989)
engaged in comparable behavior have
not been the subject of sanctions.
Malicious
Offenders argue that the accusers have They deserve it Garrett et al.
intentions
devious and malevolent motives.
because they (1989)
did it out of
spite.
Justification by Offenders justify their actions by
I could be
Cromwell &
comparison
comparing their crimes to more serious doing
Thurman (2003)
offenses.
something
more serious.
Justification by Offenders suppresses their guilt feelings I will deal with Cromwell &
postponement
by momentarily putting them out of
it later.
Thurman (2003)
mind to be dealt with at a later time.
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Organizational injustice
Organizational injustice refers to the phenomena that influences employees’
perceptions of fairness/unfairness (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). In the extant literature,
the term injustice is interchangeably used with justice. Fairness perceptions relate to how
outcomes are distributed (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson,
Porter, & Ng, 2001; Lim, 2002), how procedures are executed (Cohen-Charash &
Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Leventhal, 1980; Lim, 2002), the way people are
treated by authorities or other third-parties (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt et al., 2001;
Tyler & Bies, 1990), and the adequacy of information provided relating to outcomes and
procedures (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt et al., 2001; Lim, 2002; Shapiro, Buttner, &
Barry, 1994; Tyler & Bies, 1990). For example, employees may perceive that
organizational injustice occurs when a promotion or reward they feel they deserve is,
instead, given to a coworker. After feeling they have been treated unfairly, these
otherwise normally ethical employees may exhibit deviant behaviors (Aquino et al.,
1999). A substantial amount of literature has examined the issue of fairness or
organizational justice (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001;
Colquitt et al., 2001; Dupré, Barling, Turner, & Stride, 2010; Greenberg, 1990; Lim,
2002; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Understanding the
influence of organizational injustice on individual motives to engage in deviant behaviors
may be critical to protecting company information and/or assets. Information systems
security research related to these motives is largely under-explored (Willison &
Warkentin, 2013). For this reason, perceptions of organizational injustice are a primary
focus in this research. Three initial categories or constructs emerged from studies of
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organizational justice: distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice.
Further research has broken interactional justice into subsets of interpersonal justice and
informational justice (Greenberg, 1993; Shapiro et al., 1994).
Distributive injustice
Distributive justice is defined as the fairness of outcome distributions or
allocations (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Lim, 2002). When
inputs and outcomes are perceived to be out of balance, individuals will develop
perceptions of distributive injustice (Adams, 1965). These perceptions affect attitude,
satisfaction, commitment, and turnover (Ambrose & Cropanzano, 2003; Sager, 1991).
Additionally, Aquino et al. (1999) suggest that these injustice perceptions “evoke feelings
of dissatisfaction and resentment that motivate aggrieved parties to react, either by
modifying their behavior to restore equity or by seeking to change the system.”
Essentially, distributive justice influences cognitive reactions (e.g. distortion of inputs
and outputs), affective reactions (e.g. anger, happiness, pride, guilt), and behavioral
reactions (e.g. performance, withdrawal, misuse) to the particular outcomes (CohenCharash & Spector, 2001).
Procedural injustice
In addition to outcome fairness, judgments are also made regarding the decision
of how outcome allocation is made, known as procedural injustice. Procedural justice is
defined as the fairness of procedures used to determine outcome distributions or
allocations (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Leventhal, 1980; Lim,
2002) and has a stronger effect on attitude than distributive justice (Ambrose &
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Cropanzano, 2003). Since procedures are a representation of how an organization
allocates resources, procedural justice is expected to be related to cognitive, affective,
and behavioral reactions towards the organization (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001).
Any unfair processes experienced by an individual may result in reactions that target an
organization. In order to ensure fairness in procedures, six rules (see Table 2.2) have been
identified and should be implemented in an organization (Cohen-Charash & Spector,
2001; Leventhal, 1980).
Table 2.2

Rules for establishing procedural justice

Rule
Consistency rule

Definition
The allocation procedures should be consistent across persons and
over time
Bias-suppression rule The personal self-interests of decision-makers should be
prevented from operating during the allocation process
Accuracy rule
The goodness of the information used in the allocation process
Correctability rule
The existence of opportunities to change an unfair decision
Representativeness
The needs, values, and outlooks of all the parties affected by the
rule
allocation process should be represented in the process
Ethicality rule
The allocation process must be compatible with fundamental
moral and ethical values of the perceiver
Interactional (interpersonal and informational) injustice
Interactional justice is the quality of treatment and explanation one receives from
organizational authorities when procedures are implemented (Bies & Moag, 1986; Tyler
& Bies, 1990). According to this definition, interactional justice can be divided into two
subsets: (1) interpersonal justice defined as the fairness of treatment (e.g. politeness,
dignity, and respect) one receives from authorities involved in executing procedures and
determining outcomes (Colquitt et al., 2001) and (2) informational justice defined as the
adequacy of explanations (e.g. reasonable, timely, and specific) that convey information
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regarding why given procedures were used and how outcomes were distributed (Colquitt
et al., 2001; Shapiro et al., 1994). When an individual perceives situations to be unfair,
both interpersonal injustice and informational injustice become important determinants of
cognitive, affective, and behavioral reactions to the source of injustice (Cohen-Charash &
Spector, 2001; Greenberg, 1990). For example, explanations that are complete, accurate,
and presented in a socially sensitive manner (i.e. exhibit informational justice) tend to
reduce negative reactions and facilitate outcome acceptance (Greenberg, 1990) and the
opposite is true as well.
Although organizations have established information security policies and
procedures to protect themselves, systems and information may be susceptible to
compromise due to feelings experienced through organizational injustice. For instance,
employees, who feel outcomes and procedures are biased and benefit others more than
themselves, may experience dissatisfaction and resentment. These feelings may cause
them to want to retaliate against the organization because they were unfairly treated.
Essentially, employees may not put forth enough effort to sufficiently protect company
assets or, even worse, these feelings may lead to misuse. Current organizational
information security policies then become pointless because affective expressions begin
to motivate employee attitudes and behaviors.
The role of affect in information security policy compliance
Although previous research has advanced knowledge discovery regarding
information security compliance, the central focus has related to cognitive factors. In
contrast, affect, which is non-cognitive in character (Baskerville, Park, & Kim, 2010) and
influences reflexes, perceptions, cognitions, and behavior (Lerner & Keltner, 2000;
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Loewenstein, 1996; Russell, 2003), has not received very much attention in information
security research. This is alarming, considering that affect is a critical part of everyday
human life and varies in its intensity and complexity. Since affect infiltrates nearly every
aspect of decision-making (Carmichael & Piquero, 2004), understanding its role in
information security behavior may give us a more holistic view of what motivates
compliance behavior. Agnew (1992) suggests that people who have felt they were
wronged may experience negative emotions, moods, or feelings such as anger, anxiety, or
resentment, and, to remedy the wrong done to them, they participate in criminal activity.
This argument is also true with compliance behaviors as affect may supersede the role of
cognition as it is shown to override rational deliberations (Carmichael & Piquero, 2004).
For example, considering the previous example of organizational injustice, employees
may commit an information security policy violation because their negative emotions,
moods, or feelings such as anger “got the best of them,” and their company “had it
coming.” For this reason, understanding the role of affect on information security policy
attitude and compliance behavior is a vital part of this study.
Affect in information systems research
Considering that affective experiences have both attitudinal and behavioral
consequences (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), information systems research has explored
its influence on information systems constructs (P. Zhang, 2013). In fact, affect plays a
major role as it explains a substantial amount of variance in various dependent constructs.
Information systems literature has shown significant relationships between positive
emotions (e.g. enjoyment, playfulness, pleasure, satisfaction, and arousal), negative
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emotions (e.g., anger, distress, and anxiety), and constructs such as ease of use, perceived
usefulness, attitude toward use, intention to use, use, and training (See Table 2.3).
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Table 2.3

Affect relationships in information systems research

Related Constructs
Adoption intention
Approach-avoidance
behavior
Attitude

Source
Chin and Gopal (1995)
Deng and Poole (2010)

Brown et al. (2004), Gao and Koufaris (2006), Igbaria and
Parasuraman (1989), Jiang and Benbasat (2007), Kim et al.
(2007), Moon and Kim (2001), and Zhang and Li (2007)
Cognitive absorption
Agarwal and Karahanna (2000)
Collaboration
Denning (2012)
Computer self-efficacy Bessière et al. (2006) and Thatcher and Perrewé (2002)
Computer anxiety
Igbaria and Parasuraman (1989) and Thatcher and Perrewe
(2002)
Continuance intention
Bhattacherjee (2001), Kim et al. (2007), Lin et al. (2005),
and Otim and Grover (2006)
Effort
Djamasbi (2007)
Experience
Bessière et al. (2006)
Information avoidance Yang and Kaylor (2012)
Information
Doucet et al. (2012), Yang and Kaylor (2012), and Zhang
seeking/search
et al. (2013)
Intention to use
Cenfetelli (2004), Davis (1992), Djamasbi and Strong
(behavioral intention)
(2008), Moon and Kim (2001), Venkatesh and Speier
(1999), Venkatesh et al. (2003), and Zhang and Li (2007)
Intrinsic motivation
Venkatesh and Speier (1999)
Judgment
Djamasbi (2007) and Kuo et al. (2010)
Learning
Webster and Martocchio (1992)
Masked affective priming Comesaña et al. (2013)
Perceived ease of use
Cenfetelli (2004), Djamasbi et al. (2010), Venkatesh
(1999), Venkatesh (2000), and Zhang and Li (2005)
Perceived expected
Zaman et al. (2010)
creativity
Information/knowledge Yang and Kaylor (2012) and Zhang et al. (2013)
insufficiency
Perceived usefulness
Zhang and Li (2005) and Zhang and Li (2007)
Productivity
Doucet et al. (2012)
Satisfaction
Doucet et al. (2012) and Lin et al. (2005)
Situational factors
Bessière et al. (2006)
Training
Venkatesh and Speier (1999)
Turnover intention
Rutner et al. (2008)
Use
Beaudry and Pinsonneault (2010), Compeau and Higgins
(1995), Compeau et al. (1999), Fadel (2012), Loiacono and
Djamasbi (2010), and Venkatesh and Speier (1999)
Work exhaustion
Rutner et al. (2008)
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Although affect has played a major role in information systems research, its
presence is much less noticeable among information systems security literature,
specifically related to security behaviors. Table 2.4 includes a few of the studies that have
explored the influence of affect on behavioral information security constructs. Given that
affect has not received much attention in information systems security research, the
inclusion of affect is a critical component of this research study.
Table 2.4

Affect relationships in information security research

Related Constructs
Abuse-negative and abusepositive affect
Computer abuse or deviant
behavior
Computer abuse intent
Decision-making
Deterrence
e-Trust
Intention to disclose personal
information
Perceived lack of attributed
trust
Perceived risk
Privacy protection belief
Privacy risk belief
Website privacy
Website trust

Study
Kim et al. (2012)
Baskerville et al. (2010) and Posey, Bennett, and
Roberts (2011)
Kim et al. (2012)
Bahr and Ford (2011)
Willison and Warkentin (2013)
Hwang and Kim (2007)
Wakefield (2013)
Posey, Bennett, and Roberts (2011)
Ma and Wang (2009) and Zhang et al. (2013)
Li et al. (2011)
Li et al. (2011)
Wakefield (2013)
Wakefield (2013)

Defining affect
Affect is an umbrella term for a set of more specific concepts that include
emotions, moods, and feelings (Bagozzi et al., 1999; Russell, 2003; P. Zhang, 2013). For
a description of various terms related to affect see Table 2.5. Affect can be either
negative or positive. Positive affect is defined as the propensity of individuals to view
33

themselves and the world around them in generally positive terms (Podsakoff et al.,
2003) such as enthusiastic, active, and alert (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) or has a
zest for life (Watson & Tellegen, 1985). In contrast, negative affect is the propensity of
individuals to view themselves and the world around them in generally negative terms
(Podsakoff et al., 2003) such as upset, distressed, or unpleasantly aroused engagement
which is indicated by various aversive mood states (Watson et al., 1988; Watson &
Tellegen, 1985).
An individual’s core affect can be broken into two dimensions: trait affect and
state affect (Carmichael & Piquero, 2004). Trait affect, also termed affective disposition
(Judge & Higgins, 1998), is consciously accessible and determines the extent one feels
hedonic/valence (pleasure/displeasure) and arousal (activated/sleepy) values (Russell,
2003). It drives a person’s mood, defined as the enduring predominance of certain types
of subjective feelings that have no stimulus or quasi-stimulus (Russell, 2003; Scherer,
2005). Trait affect is extremely important to understand as it impacts an individual’s
reflexes, perception, cognition, and behavior (Russell, 2003). Essentially, trait affect is
the relatively stable tendency to experience certain emotions over time which are not
subject to stimuli. These tendencies have been shown to moderate existing relationships
and influence key constructs such as job satisfaction, performance, and turnover (Judge,
1993; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).
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Table 2.5

Definition of key terms related to affect

Concept
Affect

Definition
Umbrella term for a set of more specific concepts that includes emotions,
moods, and feelings (Bagozzi et al., 1999; Russell, 2003; P. Zhang, 2013).
Affective Cue Specific features or characteristics of a stimulus that can manifest the
affective quality of the stimulus (Soldat, Sinclair, & Mark, 1997; P. Zhang,
2013).
Affective
The ability of a stimulus to change an individual’s core affect (Russell,
Quality
2003).
Attitude
Relatively enduring beliefs and predispositions towards specific objects or
persons (Ajzen, 1991) with cognitive, affective, and motivational or
behavior components (Scherer, 2005)
Core Affect
A two-dimensional construct that describes an individual’s emotions and
moods (Russell, 2003). Core affect may or may not be directed toward an
object (Loiacono & Djamasbi, 2010).
Emotion
An affective or mental state of readiness that arises from cognitive
appraisals of events or thoughts (Bagozzi et al., 1999), is a subjective
feeling that is short-lived (Djamasbi, 2007; Loiacono & Djamasbi, 2010).
Feeling
A component of emotion defined as the subjective emotional experience
presumed to have an important monitoring and regulation function
(Scherer, 2005).
Mood
Relative enduring predominance of certain types of subjective feelings that
affect the experience and behavior of a person (Scherer, 2005) and have no
stimulus or quasi-stimulus (Russell, 2003).
Negative Affect A mood-dispositional dimension that reflects pervasive individual
differences in negative emotionality and self-concept (Watson & Clark,
1984).
Positive Affect A mood-dispositional dimension that reflects pervasive individual
differences in positive emotionality and self-concept (Watson & Clark,
1984).
Preferences
Relatively stable evaluative judgments in the sense of liking or disliking a
stimulus, or preferring it or not over other objects or stimuli (Scherer,
2005)
State Affect
Mental state of readiness that arises from cognitive appraisals of events or
thoughts (Bagozzi et al., 1999).
Stimulus
The person, condition, thing, or event at which a mental state is directed
(Object)
(Russell, 2003).
Temperament A characteristic, habitual inclination, or mode of emotional response
(Watson & Clark, 1994).
Trait Affect
The relatively stable tendency to experience certain moods more frequently
or to be prone to react with certain types of emotions, even upon slight
provocation (Judge, 1992; Russell, 2003; Scherer, 2005). Also known as
affective disposition (Judge & Higgins, 1998).
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State affect pertains to individual emotions which are determined by five different
appraisals: situational state, probability, agency, motivational state, and power (see Table
2.6). An emotion is defined as a mental state of readiness that arises from cognitive
appraisals of events or thoughts (Bagozzi et al., 1999). Compared to moods, emotions are
typically more intense, shorter in duration, and have specificity with regard to a particular
object or behavioral response (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Beaudry and Pinsonneault
(2010) have further classified positive and negative emotions into four categories:
achievement (e.g. pleasure), challenge (e.g. playfulness), loss (e.g. anger), and deterrence
(e.g. fear; see Figure 2.5). Achievement and challenge emotions are in response to an
opportunity; whereas, loss and deterrence are in response to a threat. In addition,
individuals who experience achievement and loss emotions feel they lack control over
their consequences; however, individuals who experience challenge and deterrence
emotions feel they have some control over their consequences. Eventually, these
emotions or affective states direct and motivate behavior (Ilies & Judge, 2002).
Essentially, positive emotions may lead to impulse-driven behaviors, such as
organizational citizenship behaviors, while negative emotions may lead to turnover,
deviance, or other withdrawal behaviors. For example, an employee who feels he or she
has been mistreated by his or her organization may experience anger. Although the anger
experienced may be intense and short-lived, during this timeframe this employee may
have already reacted against the organization.
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Table 2.6

Appraisal of state affect (Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990)

Appraisal
Situational
State
Probability

Definition
A determinant of positive or negative emotions experienced based on
whether events are consistent or inconsistent with an individual’s motives.
The certainty of outcomes. Certain outcomes produce joy and sadness and
uncertain outcomes produce hope and fear.
Agency
An individual’s control over a situation and leads to emotions such as
sadness (lack of control), anger (caused by others), or guilt (caused by
self).
Motivational The drive towards earning a reward or avoiding punishment which elicits
state
joy/sadness or relief/distress.
Power
Individual perceptions of oneself. Strong individual perceptions lead to
frustration, anger, or regret. Weak individual perceptions lead to sadness,
distress, fear, and guilt.

Figure 2.5

Framework for classifying emotions (Beaudry & Pinsonneault, 2010)
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Affective events theory
Knowing that both trait and state affect influence judgment, attitude, and
behavior, I examined affective events theory (see Figure 2.6) as an overarching theory
that drives this study. Affective events theory (1) focuses on the structure, causes, and
consequences of affective experiences, (2) directs attention to events as proximal causes
of affective reactions, (3) includes time as a critical parameter between affect and
satisfaction, and (4) considers the structure of affective reactions as important as the
structure of environments (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). For instance, an employee may
affectively react (e.g. anger) to a work–related event (e.g. organizational injustice) which
may lead to severe consequences for the organization (e.g. system misuse or policy
noncompliance). By paying attention to affective experiences over time, organizations
may be able to “calm the flames” before anything disastrous happens to organizational
assets and information.

Figure 2.6

Affective events theory
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Derived from affective events theory and prior literature, I introduce two new
constructs, affective absorption and affective flow, which are used in this study to further
understand attitudes and behaviors specifically related to information security policies.
Affective absorption
In order to better understand affective absorption, we need to understand
absorption first. Absorption is a trait or disposition to devote all attentional resources to
an object of attention (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). Roche and McConkey (1990)
summarize absorption as the "readiness for experiences of deep involvement, a
heightened sense of the reality of the attentional object, an imperviousness to normally
distracting events, and an appraisal of information in unconventional and idiosyncratic
ways." In essence, it is an individual's “openness to absorbing and self-altering
experiences” (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974).
Previous research has examined the impact of absorption on the use of software
while primarily focusing on cognitive processes. For example, cognitive absorption has
been defined as the level of deep involvement or a holistic experience with software
(Agarwal & Karahanna, 2000; P. Zhang, Li, & Sun, 2006). In trying to understand the
role of absorption in user behavior with information technology, Agarwal and Karahanna
(2000) extend absorption literature by developing the cognitive absorption construct with
its five dimensions: (1) temporal dissociation - the inability to register the passage of
time, (2) focused immersion - the experience of total engagement where nothing else
matters, (3) heightened enjoyment - the pleasurable aspects of the interaction, (4) control
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- the user's perception of being in charge, and (5) curiosity - the extent the experience
arouses an individual's sensory and cognitive curiosity.
Based on prior absorption literature, I derive the concept of affective absorption
which I define as the trait or disposition to become deeply involved with one’s emotions.
Two central aspects of affective absorption include positive affective absorption, the
disposition to experience deep involvement with positive emotions, and negative
affective absorption, the disposition to experience deep involvement with negative
emotions. In essence, a person who is affectively absorbed may have stronger and deeper
reactions to emotional-inducing events.
Affective flow
The trait of absorption is expected to be an antecedent of the state of flow
(Agarwal & Karahanna, 2000). Flow is defined as “the state in which people are so
involved in an activity that nothing else seems to matter…even at great cost”
(Csikszentmihaiyi, 1990). Essentially, a person in a state of flow feels as if time stands
still because he or she becomes one with the task, believing that nothing else matters
(Agarwal & Karahanna, 2000; Csikszentmihaiyi, 1990). In this state, an individual’s
attention will be consumed by the object of attention (Agarwal & Karahanna, 2000). This
level of focused attention influences attitudes toward information systems and
information systems adoption decisions (Trevino & Webster, 1992; P. Zhang et al.,
2006). For example, individuals who enjoy browsing the web or playing video games
will experience strong hedonic processes which may cause them to neglect other aspects
of their life.
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Based on flow literature, I derive the construct affective flow and define it as the
state of deep involvement with one’s emotions that leads to the belief that nothing else
matters. Essentially, affective flow differs from flow in that an individual focuses on his
or her emotions rather than an object of attention. Since absorption is expected to be an
antecedent to flow (Agarwal & Karahanna, 2000), I also expect that affective absorption
to be an antecedent to affective flow. Similar to affective absorption, affective flow also
has two central aspects: (1) positive affective flow, the state of deep involvement with
positive emotions, and (2) negative affective flow, the state of deep involvement with
negative emotions. In essence, affective flow causes emotions that render a person unable
to register the passage of time, result in total engagement with these emotions to the point
that nothing else matters, and lead to lack control over one’s emotions.
The primary focus for the remainder of this study will be on negative affective
absorption and negative affective flow. Consider the example of a driver with road rage.
This driver is in a hurry to get to his final destination but is stopped by a traffic light.
Emotions of frustration and anger may rise and continue to grow until the light changes.
In his state of negative affective flow, after the light changes he may express, “I am going
to blow up that street light next time it makes me wait so long!” when in reality it only
took a matter of seconds. Similarly, individuals within an organization may experience
negative affective flow to the point that nothing else matters anymore other than
quenching their emotions through detrimental effects such as insider abuse or
noncompliance with information security policies. Organizations need to recognize their
employees’ emotional state of negative affective flow so they can step in and address
issues prior to incidents.
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Research model and hypotheses development
Based on the previous discussion of information security policy compliance,
affective absorption, and affective flow, I propose the following research model as
depicted in Figure 2.7. Consistent with affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano,
1996), the model incorporates cognitive, affective, and attitudinal states as well as
dispositional traits. In this model, fairness (i.e. organizational injustice) is expected to
have a negative relationship with negative affective flow and, together, organizational
injustice and negative affective flow negatively influence an individual’s attitude towards
information security policy and information security policy compliance behavior.

Figure 2.7

Conceptual model
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Frustrating tasks
Affective events theory indicates that frustrating tasks may cause negative
affective reactions (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Eventually, these emotions direct and
motivate behavior (Ilies & Judge, 2002) which may lead to deviance or criminal activity
such as policy noncompliance or system misuse (Agnew, 1992). Based on this previous
research, I hypothesize that:
H1: Individuals who are subjected to frustrating tasks are less likely to comply with
information security policy.
Perceived organizational injustice
As previously discussed in this chapter, organizational justice is the term used to
describe the perceptions of fairness an individual experiences. Ensuring that employees
perceive they are being treated fairly by their organization may be critical to protecting
company information and/or assets. Since unfairness directly or indirectly affects
people’s emotions, cognitions, and behavior (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001),
employees who perceive they are being treated unfairly may (1) experience negative
emotions such as disgruntlement (Willison & Warkentin, 2009) and anger (Dupré et al.,
2010), (2) ponder ways to retaliate against the organization (Bennett & Robinson, 2000),
and (3) rationalize deviant behavior such as noncompliance or cybercrime (Li, Zhang, &
Sarathy, 2010; Lim, 2002). Therefore, otherwise normally ethical employees may engage
in deviant behaviors (Aquino et al., 1999). Depending on the level of injustice
experienced, an individual may become completely immersed in his or her negative
emotions which could lead to disaster unless the situation is rectified.
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Perceived distributive injustice
Distributive injustice is defined as the unfairness of outcome distributions or
allocations (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Lim, 2002).
Perceptions of distributive injustice evoke feelings of anger, dissatisfaction, and
resentment (Aquino et al., 1999; Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001), affect attitude,
satisfaction, commitment, and turnover (Ambrose & Cropanzano, 2003; Sager, 1991),
and influence behavioral reactions such that individuals who experience distributive
injustice may seek to restore equity or change the system (Aquino et al., 1999; CohenCharash & Spector, 2001). Therefore, I propose the following:
H2A: Perceived distributive injustice is positively related to negative affective flow.
H3A: Perceived distributive injustice is negatively related to attitude toward specific
information security policy.
H4A: Perceived distributive injustice is negatively related to information security policy
compliance.
Perceived procedural injustice
Procedural injustice is defined as the unfairness of procedures used to determine
outcome distributions or allocations (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al.,
2001; Leventhal, 1980; Lim, 2002). Procedural injustice relates to cognitive, affective,
and behavioral reactions towards an organization (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001) and
has a stronger effect on attitude than distributive justice (Ambrose & Cropanzano, 2003).
Hence, I posit that:
H2B: Perceived procedural injustice is positively related to negative affective flow.
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H3B: Perceived procedural injustice is negatively related to attitude toward specific
information security policy.
H4B: Perceived procedural injustice is negatively related to information security policy
compliance.
Perceived interpersonal injustice
Interpersonal injustice is defined as the fairness of treatment from authority who
is involved in executing procedures and determining outcomes (Colquitt et al., 2001).
Individuals who perceive they are being treated unfairly by authority figures experience
cognitive, affective, and behavioral reactions to the source of injustice (Cohen-Charash &
Spector, 2001; Greenberg, 1990). For example, individuals who feel they have not been
treated politely or with dignity or respect will experience increased negative reactions.
Based on this rational, I hypothesize the following:
H2C: Perceived interpersonal injustice is positively related to negative affective flow.
H3C: Perceived interpersonal injustice is negatively related to attitude toward specific
information security policy.
H4C: Perceived interpersonal injustice is negatively related to information security policy
compliance.
Perceived informational injustice
Informational injustice is defined as the adequacy of explanations that convey
information regarding why given procedures were used and how outcomes were
distributed (Colquitt et al., 2001; Shapiro et al., 1994). Individuals who believe the
amount of information provided was unfair will experience cognitive, affective, and
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behavioral reactions to the source of injustice (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001;
Greenberg, 1990). For example, incomplete or inaccurate information would increase an
individual’s negative reactions. Accordingly, I propose the following:
H2D: Perceived informational injustice is positively related to negative affective flow.
H3D: Perceived informational injustice is negatively related to attitude toward specific
information security policy.
H4D: Perceived informational injustice is negatively related to information security
policy compliance.
Negative affective absorption
Negative affective absorption is defined as the disposition to experience deep
involvement with negative emotions. Individuals with dispositions to negative affect are
likely to have more intense bouts of emotion and react stronger when negative events
occur (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). In essence, a person who is affectively absorbed may
have stronger reactions to emotional-inducing events; therefore, I hypothesize that:
H5: Negative affective absorption is positively related to negative affective flow.
Negative affective flow
Both personal and work-related experiences cause high-intensity emotions (J. J.
Kim et al., 2012; Willison & Backhouse, 2006). These emotions may lead to decisions
that are contrary to self-interests (Willison & Warkentin, 2013) such as workplace
deviance (Judge et al., 2006; Lee & Allen, 2002). In addition, these emotions form
affective processes – necessary and important components of rational decision making
(Djamasbi et al., 2010) – and influence cognitive processes and behavior (Lerner &
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Keltner, 2000; Loewenstein, 1996). In addition, as the intensity of affect increases, so
does its direct influence on behavior (Carmichael & Piquero, 2004; Loewenstein, 1996).
Intense levels of affect may result in people becoming deeply involved in their emotions,
thereby, impacting attitudes, judgments, and behavior (Ilies & Judge, 2002). Determined
by the level of emotions experience, this affective state may result in leaving work,
organizational or interpersonal deviance, or other withdrawal behaviors (Ilies & Judge,
2002). In this research, I term this state of deep involvement with negative emotions as
negative affective flow and postulate that:
H6: Negative affective flow is negatively related to attitude toward specific information
security policy.
H7: Negative affective flow is negatively related to information security policy
compliance.
Attitude toward information security policy
Attitude toward information security policy is defined as relatively enduring
beliefs and predispositions (favorable or unfavorable) towards information security
policies (Ajzen, 1991; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Scherer, 2005). In this study, I examined
attitude toward general and specific information security policies. Attitude toward
general information security policy refers to all information security policies while
attitude toward specific information security policy is context specific (e.g. password
policy). Since the latter is a subset of the former, I hypothesize that:
H8: Attitude toward general information security policy is positively associated with
attitude toward specific information security policy.
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Prior behavioral theories such as theory of reasoned action and theory of planned
behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) have shown that behavioral intention is
influenced by attitude, normative beliefs, and perceived behavioral control. Existing
literature in information systems has shown the impact of these variables on behavioral
information security intention variables such as information security policy compliance
intention (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Hosack et al., 2009; Siponen et
al., 2007; Warkentin et al., 2011). However, collecting only behavioral intention in the
context of information security introduces data collection and measurement issues (e.g.
social desirability bias, common method bias, acquiescence bias) because subjects may
not accurately respond for fear of the negative consequences that could impact their
image or job security (Crossler et al., 2013). Instead, while exploring phenomena related
to information security, measuring actual behavior is much more valuable than collecting
behavioral security intention (C. L. Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Crossler et al., 2013;
Mahmood et al., 2010; Straub, 2009; Warkentin et al., 2012). Hence, in this study I
examine actual behavior related to information security policy compliance:
H9: Attitude toward specific information security policy is positively associated with
information security policy compliance.
Summary
In this chapter, I defined information security policy compliance and described
why it is important to organizations. Next, I discussed the role of cognition on
information security policy compliance behavior. Then, I discussed the role of affect on
information security policy compliance behavior while introducing two new constructs,
affective absorption and affective flow, and how they relate to information security policy
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compliance decisions. Finally, I presented my conceptual research model and hypotheses.
Table 2.7 provides a summary of each hypothesis and Figure 2.8 illustrates this complete
model including hypotheses. The next chapter presents the method used to test these
hypotheses.
Table 2.7
HO
H1
H2A
H2B
H2C
H2D
H3A
H3B
H3C
H3D
H4A
H4B
H4C
H4D
H5
H6
H7
H8
H9

Hypotheses and structural relationships

Structural Relationship (ISP = information security policy)
Individuals who are subjected to frustrating tasks are less likely to comply with ISP.
Perceived distributive injustice is positively related to negative affective flow.
Perceived procedural injustice is positively related to negative affective flow.
Perceived interpersonal injustice is positively related to negative affective flow.
Perceived informational injustice is positively related to negative affective flow.
Perceived distributive injustice is negatively related to attitude toward specific ISP.
Perceived procedural injustice is negatively related to attitude toward specific ISP.
Perceived interpersonal injustice is negatively related to attitude toward specific
ISP.
Perceived informational injustice is negatively related to attitude toward specific
ISP.
Perceived distributive injustice is negatively related to ISP compliance.
Perceived procedural injustice is negatively related to ISP compliance.
Perceived interpersonal injustice is negatively related to ISP compliance.
Perceived informational injustice is negatively related to ISP compliance.
Negative affective absorption is positively related to negative affective flow.
Negative affective flow is negatively related to attitude toward specific ISP.
Negative affective flow is negatively related to ISP compliance.
Attitude toward general ISP is positively related to attitude toward specific ISP.
Attitude toward specific ISP is positively related to ISP compliance.
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Figure 2.8

Conceptual model and hypotheses
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CHAPTER III
METHOD

In this chapter, I discuss the method employed in this dissertation. First, I describe
the classical experimental design of my experiment. Next, I introduce the experimental
procedures used to collect my data. Then, I discuss the creation of the data collection
instrument including construct definitions, adapted items, original items, and sources of
constructs included in the conceptual model. Finally, I outline the flow of this
investigation beginning with the preliminary investigation (expert panel reviews, a
pretest, and pilot studies) and ending with the primary investigation which is conducted
through a laboratory experiment. In addition, I describe the sampling frames used in both
the preliminary and primary investigations.
Instrument design
To test the conceptual model and hypotheses defined in Chapter II, I used the
classical experimental design. In this design, each participant is assigned to one of two
groups: the experimental group or the control group. Using a laboratory experiment, I
tested the phenomena of interest. Through the course of the experiment, participants
answered items related to organizational injustice, negative affective absorption, negative
affective flow, attitude toward general information security policy, and attitude toward
specific information security policy. All items were randomized to reduce order effects
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(Podsakoff et al., 2003). In addition, the participants’ information security policy
compliance behavior was directly measured. Following rigorous survey development
guidelines (Churchill, 1979; Mackenzie et al., 2011), constructs were appropriately
defined and items were sufficiently adapted to meet the context of this study. The
remainder of this section discusses this development process more in-depth.
Experimental design
Establishing measurement validity of the research design is a necessary
requirement for any research study. Classical pretest-posttest control group designs have
been used to control for internal validity issues, in other words, that the experimental
treatments indeed cause changes in posttest measures (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). To
eliminate any interaction effects due to selection bias, participants were sampled from
various student populations and randomly assigned to both groups. Randomization
reduces the impact of any internal validity issues because any confounding variables are
distributed across both groups.
Experimental procedure
All participants were recruited to participate in the experiment by completing an
online Qualtrics survey. In this recruitment survey, participants first read an electronic
consent form. If a participant elected to participate in the experiment, he or she provided
his or her name and ID and selected the most convenient time to participate in the
experiment. Additionally, this survey contained a preliminary assessment of self-reported
perceptions of the latent variables attitude toward general information security policy and
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negative affective absorption. Finally, this survey was used to collect demographic
information. See Figure 3.1 for a graphical depiction of the experimental procedures.

Figure 3.1

Laboratory experiment flow

Upon entering the lab during the pre-selected time, participants were given a
random username and password. Participants were instructed to enter the username when
requested but were told to never share the password they were assigned. Each participant
was randomly assigned to a control group or an experimental group. This random
assignment establishes internal and external validity by ensuring differences between
groups is due to the treatment that subjects experienced.
Next, all participants were exposed to a video demonstration describing the tasks
of the experiment. This video presentation was used to explain the experimental
procedures to the participants. The video ensured that both groups experienced the same
introduction, reducing bias that could be attributed to experimental instructions. After the
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video demonstration, participants downloaded a macro-enabled Excel spreadsheet (.xlsm)
from Qualtrics which contained the experimental treatment (See Figure 3.2 & Figure
3.3).

Figure 3.2

Production information screenshot

Figure 3.3

Decision history screenshot
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The experiment consisted of a production environment, similar to a laboratory
experiment by Djamasbi & Loiacono (2008), where participants were asked to make ten
decisions. For each decision, subjects were expected to produce enough supply to meet
demand while maintaining a suggested amount of inventory. After each decision,
participants received immediate feedback detailing the percent error achieved and a
reward was attributed accordingly. Decisions with less than 10% error from the actual
required production needed received ten reward points, decisions with greater than 10%
error and less than 25% error from the actual required production needed received five
reward points, and decisions with 25% error or more from the actual required production
needed received zero reward points. Participants were informed that their total extra
credit was determined by their success in this experiment. When all the participants
completed the treatment, they were then presented with a solution to achieve better
results (see Figure 3.4); however, this solution required that the participants shared their
password before receiving help. This solution was used to capture actual compliance with
information security policy. Participants in the control group experienced the experiment
as demonstrated in the video presentation; however, the experimental group experienced
a different algorithm for calculating percent error. This algorithm resulted in a high
percent of error in their choices which led to reduced reward. Despite the decision
(correct or incorrect) participants made, their answer would almost always exceed the
25% error threshold resulting in zero reward points. After each decision, the negative
results were expected to increase the level of negative affect and induce participants into
state of negative affective flow.
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Figure 3.4

Password request screenshot

Finally, all groups experienced the final survey. The final survey assessed selfreported perceptions of the latent variables perceived organizational injustice, negative
affective flow, and attitude toward information security policy.
Groups were then compared for any differences using structural equation
modeling in AMOS 22. The total sample size for the treatment group was 172 and for the
control group was 159. Groups were compared to determine whether differences in latent
variable measurements were due to the experimental treatment. Results are discussed
further in Chapter IV.
Measurement
In order to identify and investigate information security policy compliance
behavior, the following theories were used as the underlining theoretical foundation for
this research: the positive and negative affect schedule, the theory of reasoned action, the
theory of planned behavior, and the affective events theory. The constructs evaluated in
this study are latent variables which are “research abstractions that cannot be measured
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directly” (Gefen & Straub, 2005) and include organizational injustice, negative affective
absorption, negative affective flow, attitude toward general information security policy,
and attitude toward specific information security policy. Additionally, information
security policy compliance is a direct measure of behavior captured through the
experiment.
Both organizational injustice and negative affective absorption are predicted to be
determinants of negative affective flow. Additionally, organizational injustice, negative
affective flow, and attitude toward general information security policy are predicted to be
direct determinants of attitude toward specific information security policy. Also,
organizational injustice, negative affective flow, and attitude toward specific information
security policy are predicted to be direct determinants of information security policy
compliance behavior. Attitude embodies the cognitive and affective disposition toward an
information security policy and is expected to be an antecedent to information security
policy compliance behavior. According to the theory of reasoned action and the theory of
planned behavior, attitude is a determinant of behavioral intent which is a determinant of
behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Therefore, attitude towards information
security policy is predicted as a determinant for information security policy compliance
behavior.
Measurement items for previously named constructs, except negative affective
absorption and negative affective flow, were adapted from previously validated reflective
multi-item scales in information systems security research, organizational behavior, and
social psychology. All scales were developed following the recommended guidelines of
Churchill (1979) and Mackenzie et al. (2011) to ensure scale validity and reliability (See
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Figure 3.5). The measurement and validation of these constructs is elaborated in the
remainder of this chapter.

Figure 3.5

Overview of scale development procedure (Mackenzie et al., 2011)
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Perceived organizational injustice
Organizational injustice items were adapted from Lim’s (2002) distributive justice
scale and Turel et al.’s (2008) procedural justice, informational justice, and interpersonal
justice scale. Distributive injustice is when the ratio of work outputs (rewards) and inputs
(contributions) to the ratio of a comparative other are perceived to be unfair (Adams,
1965; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Procedural injustice is the perceived unfairness of
the process experienced by an individual by which the outcomes were achieved (CohenCharash & Spector, 2001). Interpersonal injustice is the degree to which people are not
treated with politeness, dignity, and respect by decision makers (Turel et al., 2008).
Informational injustice is the degree that the explanations provided do not convey the
reasoning behind processes and outcomes (Turel et al., 2008). The items with their
associated item ID, original item, and source are listed in Table 3.1, Table 3.2, Table 3.3,
and Table 3.4. All items were measured using fully anchored five-point Likert agreement
scales (See Appendix A).
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Table 3.1

Perceived distributive injustice scale

Item ID
Item
Original Item
Source
DINJ1 Based on the effort I put into this How fairly has the organization Lim (2002)
exercise, the extra credit I
been rewarding you for the
received was unfair.
amount of effort you have put in?
DINJ2 Based on the instructions I was How fairly has the organization
assigned during this exercise, the
been rewarding you for the
extra credit I received was unfair.
responsibilities you have?
DINJ3
Based on the decisions I
How fairly has the organization
completed during this exercise, been rewarding you for the work
the extra credit I received was.
that you have done well?
DINJ4 Based on the stress I experienced How fairly has the organization
during this exercise, the extra
been rewarding you for the
credit I received was unfair.
stresses and strains of your job?
DINJ5 Based on the training provided How fairly has the organization
during the exercise, the extra
been rewarding you for the
credit I received was unfair. amount of education and training
you received?

Table 3.2

Perceived procedural injustice scale

Item ID
PINJ1

Item
The decision process of this
exercise was unreasonable.

PINJ2

The decision process of this
exercise was inconsistent.
The decision process of this
exercise was unfair.
The decision process of this
exercise was flawed.
The decision process of this
exercise was rigged.

PINJ3
PINJ4
PINJ5

Original Item
Have you had influence over the
outcome arrived at by those
procedures?
Have those procedures been
applied consistently?
Have those procedures been free
of bias?
Have those procedures been
based on accurate information?
Created for this study.
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Source
Turel,
Yuan, and
Connelly
(2008)

Table 3.3

Perceived interpersonal injustice scale

Item ID
Item
Original Item
Source
IINJ1 During the exercise, I was treated The service representative treated Turel,
in a polite manner.
you in a polite manner?
Yuan, and
IINJ2 During the exercise, I was treated The service representative treated Connelly
(2008)
with dignity.
you with dignity?
IINJ3 During the exercise, I was treated The service representative treated
with respect.
you with respect?

Table 3.4

Perceived informational injustice scale

Item ID
Item
FINJ1 The video presentation did not
explain this exercise thoroughly.

Original Item
Source
Has the service representative Turel,
explained the procedure
Yuan, and
thoroughly?
Connelly
FINJ2
The video presentation
Were the service representative (2008)
explanations regarding this
explanations regarding the
exercise were unreasonable.
procedure reasonable?
FINJ3 The experimental instructions
Has the service representative
were conveyed using a method I seemed to tailor communications
do not prefer.
to individuals’ specific needs?
FINJ4 The video presentation did not
Has the service representative
sufficiently provide detailed
been candid in communications
instructions about the exercise.
with you?

Negative affective absorption
As previously defined in this paper, negative affective absorption is the trait or
disposition to become deeply involved with one’s negative emotions. This construct was
developed for this study and is a reflective construct measured by five items (see Table
3.5). Each item was measured using a fully anchored five-point Likert agreement scale
(See Appendix A).
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Table 3.5
Item ID
NAA1
NAA2
NAA3
NAA4
NAA5

Negative affective absorption scale
Item
In general, I lose track of time when I experience negative
emotions.
In general, negative emotions occupy my attention.
In general, it is hard for me to focus on something other than
my negative emotions.
In general, I become deeply involved with my negative
emotions.
In general, I have no control over my negative emotions.

Source
Developed
for this
study.

Negative affective flow
As previously defined in this paper, negative affective flow is the state of deep
involvement with one’s emotions that leads to the belief that nothing else matters. This
construct was also developed for this study and is a reflective construct measured by five
items (see Table 3.6). Each item was measured using a fully anchored five-point Likert
agreement scale (See Appendix A).
Table 3.6
Item ID
NAF1
NAF2
NAF3
NAF4
NAF5

Negative affective flow scale
Item
During this exercise, I lost track of time due to my negative
emotions.
During this exercise, negative emotions occupied my attention.
During this exercise, it was hard to focus on something other
than the negative emotions I experienced.
During this exercise, I became deeply involved with negative
emotions.
During this exercise, I had no control over my negative
emotions.
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Source
Developed
for this
study.

Attitude toward general information security policy
According to Ajzen (1991), attitude is defined as the relatively enduring beliefs
and predispositions (favorable or unfavorable) towards a given behavior. This definition
is extended by Herath and Rao (2009) to define attitude toward information security
policy as the relatively enduring beliefs and predispositions toward information security
policies. Since attitude is an important construct that is consistently shown to influence
behavioral intentions and behavior, it is further explored in this study. The items for
attitude toward general information security policy were adapted from Herath and Rao’s
(2009b) security policy attitude scale and Bulgurcu et al.’s (2010) attitude scale. The
items with their associated item ID, original item, and source are listed in Table 3.7 and
were assessed using a fully anchored five-point Likert agreement scale (See Appendix
A).
Table 3.7

Attitude toward general information security policy scale

Item ID
Item
Original Item
GATT1 Complying with the requirements Adopting security technologies
of an information security policy
and practices is important.
is important.
GATT2 Complying with the requirements Adopting security technologies
of an information security policy
and practices is beneficial.
is beneficial.
GATT3 Complying with the requirements Adopting security technologies
of an information security policy
and practices is helpful.
is helpful.
GATT4 Complying with the requirements To me, complying with the
of an information security policy
requirements of the ISP is
is necessary.
unnecessary/necessary.
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Source
Herath and
Rao
(2009b) &
Bulgurcu et
al. (2010)

Attitude toward specific information security policy
Attitude toward specific information security policy differs from attitude toward
general information security policy in that it relates to the context of a particular task. The
items for attitude toward specific information security policy were adapted from Herath
and Rao’s (2009b) security policy attitude scale and Bulgurcu et al.’s (2010) attitude
scale. The items with their associated item ID, original item, and source are listed in
Table 3.8 and were assessed using a fully anchored five-point Likert agreement scale
(See Appendix A).
Table 3.8

Attitude toward specific information security policy scale

Item ID
Item
Original Item
SATT1 In this exercise, it was important Adopting security technologies
that I not share my password.
and practices is important.
SATT2 In this exercise, it was critical Adopting security technologies
that I not share my password.
and practices is beneficial.
SATT3 In this exercise, it was essential Adopting security technologies
that I not share my password.
and practices is helpful.
SATT4 In this exercise, it was necessary
To me, complying with the
that I not share my password.
requirements of the ISP is
unnecessary/necessary.

Source
Herath and
Rao
(2009b) &
Bulgurcu et
al. (2010)

Information security policy compliance
For the measurement of information security policy compliance, actual
compliance was directly measured through observed behavior. Table 3.9 includes a
summary of the variables of interest with definitions, definition sources, and whether it is
an independent or dependent variable.
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Table 3.9

Variables of interest

Variable
Definition
Independent variables
Distributive
The ratio of work outputs (rewards) and input
injustice
(contributions) to the ratio of a comparative
other are perceived to be unfair.
Procedural
The perceived unfairness of the process by
injustice
which the outcomes were achieved.
Interpersonal The degree to which people are not treated with
injustice
politeness, dignity, and respect by decision
makers.
Informational The extent that the explanations provided do not
injustice
sufficiently convey the reasoning behind
processes and outcomes.
Negative
The predisposition to become deeply involved
affective
with one’s negative emotions.
absorption
Negative
The state of deep involvement with one’s
affective flow negative emotions that leads to the belief that
nothing else matters.
Attitude toward Relatively enduring beliefs and predispositions
general
(favorable or unfavorable) towards all
information
information security policies.
security policy
Attitude toward Relatively enduring beliefs and predispositions
specific
(favorable or unfavorable) towards a specific
information
information security policies.
security policy
Dependent variable
Information
An employee’s actual behavior to protect the
security policy information and technology resources of the
compliance
organization from potential security breaches.

Definition Source
Adams (1965) &
Willison and
Warkentin (2013)
Cohen-Charash and
Spector (2001)
Turel, Yuan, and
Connelly (2008)
Turel, Yuan, and
Connelly (2008)
Developed for this
study.
Developed for this
study.
Ajzen (1991);
Scherer (2005);
Herath and Rao
(2009b)
Ajzen (1991);
Scherer (2005);
Herath and Rao
(2009b)
Adapted from Bulgurcu
et al. (2010) definition
of compliance intention

Two-phase investigation
In order to test the particular phenomena being explored, I conducted a two-phase
investigation (see Figure 3.6). Through a preliminary investigative procedure, I assessed
content validity, construct validity, and reliability prior to full data collection. Through
the primary investigative procedure, the precision of the measurement items was
evaluated using a laboratory experiment.
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Figure 3.6

Flow of investigation

Preliminary investigation
Before full data collection, a preliminary investigative procedure was conducted
to assess content validity, construct validity, and reliability. Consistent with the steps of
determining content and construct validity (Churchill, 1979; Mackenzie et al., 2011),
scales were refined through (a) feedback from expert panel reviews, (b) suggestions from
pretests, (c) and initial data analysis conducted from a pilot study.
Expert panel reviews
Establishing validity is a necessary requirement for research; however, during
scale development many effects can be introduced that may reduce both content validity
and construct validity. One source is common method effects which may occur due to the
source or rater, item characteristics, item context, or measurement context (Podsakoff et
al., 2003). Refining the instrument is conducive towards reducing these effects
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). Therefore, in order to streamline the instrument, scenarios and
scales developed for this study underwent extensive expert panel reviews, as suggested in
previous research (Petter et al., 2007; Straub et al., 2004), to ensure realism, content
validity, and face validity. During several expert panel reviews, faculty and Ph.D.
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students in the Management and Information Systems Department in the College of
Business at Mississippi State University evaluated the scenarios and instrument items and
suggested changes to increase the clarity and realism of this study. Feedback from expert
panel reviews was implemented prior to data collection. For example, experimental
procedures were reworded for clarity and revised to collect actual compliance behavior
rather than compliance intention. Also, mathematical calculations were reformulated to
enhance the experimental treatment. The final instrument is in Appendix A.
Pretest
To further refine the instrument, several faculty, staff, and students from
Mississippi State University participated in a pretest of the study. The purpose of the
pretest was to identify any necessary revisions to the instrument. Participants evaluated
the full experiment, ensured procedures and technologies were properly established, and
identified any flaws or inconsistencies. For example, issues related to the video
presentation were corrected and items in the instrument were reworded for better
clarification.
Pilot study
After remedying all problems that were discovered in the pretest, the final
experiment was readied for a pilot test. The experiment was created and administered
using Qualtrics and Microsoft Excel. A sample of 111 undergraduate students from the
College of Business at Mississippi State University completed the experiment. Students
were randomly assigned to both groups of the experiment. Additionally, a subsequent
pilot study was conducted with a sample of 24 from the same population to test the
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reliability of an additional construct attitude toward specific information security policy
after it was deemed appropriate to include this in the model. Students in this second pilot
study were only assigned to the experimental group. Reliability and construct validity,
convergent and discriminant validity, were assessed for both pilot studies. Reliability is
demonstrated when the reliability estimate for each construct is above 0.70 (Fornell &
Larcker, 1981; Gefen & Straub, 2005; Mackenzie et al., 2011; Nunnally & Bernstein,
1994; Straub et al., 2004).
To assess construct validity the responses were analyzed using exploratory factor
analysis. Convergent validity is demonstrated when items of the same construct correlate
at a significant level with each other (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Peter, 1981; Straub et al.,
2004). In exploratory factor analysis, item loadings greater than 0.70 item loadings
greater than 0.70 indicate convergent validity (Straub et al., 2004).
Discriminant validity is present when items of one construct do not significantly
correlate with items of another construct (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Peter, 1981; Straub et
al., 2004). In exploratory factor analysis, discriminant validity is demonstrated when
items cross-load on different factors with item loadings less than 0.40 (Hair, Black,
Babin, & Anderson, 2010). The results for reliability and construct validity are presented
in Chapter IV.
Primary investigation
After the preliminary investigation, the main laboratory experiment was
conducted to empirically test the conceptual model and hypotheses discussed in Chapter
II. Since emotional response is an integral part of this study, adequately collecting these
responses is essential to explaining the research phenomenon. Bradley and Lang (1994)
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indicate three primary means of measuring emotional response through the observation of
behavior, self-report, or physiological response. Within a laboratory setting, this study
seeks to capture actual behavior related to individual emotional response. McGrath
(1994) suggests that laboratory experiments allow researchers to reach maximum
precision in measurement and control behaviors by concocting the situation or behavior,
defining rules, and then evaluating behavior.
To capture this behavior, this study tested the hypotheses presented in the
conceptual model in Chapter II. Voluntary respondents were recruited to participate in a
laboratory experiment and were randomly assigned to an experimental group or a control
group as previously described. During the recruitment survey, participants registered for
the study, answered items related to self-reported perceptions of the latent variables
attitude toward general information security policies and negative affective absorption,
and answered demographic questions.
After the recruitment survey, respondents returned during their appointed lab
time. Upon entering the lab, they were given a username and password and were told
never to share their password. Then they viewed a video presentation that detailed the
laboratory experiment where they would make 10 decisions and receive a reward based
on a decision. After completing their decisions, respondents were told they could improve
their results in the experiment by sharing their password. Actual compliance with
information security policy was captured whether or not the respondents submitted their
password. Then the experiment concluded and respondents were directed to a final
survey. In this survey, responses related to perceived organizational injustice, negative
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affective absorption, negative affective flow, and attitude toward specific information
security policy were captured.
Data for this study were collected from undergraduate students and were
statistically tested using both exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis
using both SPSS 21 and AMOS 22. Through these statistical package, I tested model fit,
validity and reliability, common method variance, and the structural model.
Sampling frame
The data collected for this experiment included 398 participants with a usable
sample of 331, 67 responses were dropped because of incompleteness or due to response
set. Participants were recruited from undergraduate students from various departments in
the College of Business at Mississippi State University. Participants were informed of the
laboratory experiment through in-class instruction. This population is deemed as an
appropriate sampling frame because undergraduate students are subject to their own
emotions and are expected to abide by university security policies. Additionally,
organizational employees experience similar emotions and are expected to abide by
organizational information security policies.
Measurement model fit
Using confirmatory factor analysis, I assessed measurement model fit. In
accordance with generally acceptable levels, I evaluated the model fit indices to
determine the measurement model was a good fit to the data. To establish good fit, χ2
(chi-square) was measured and the χ2 index (χ2/df) was computed. The χ2 index is better
measurement of fit than χ2 because it is less sensitive to sample size. The χ2 index should
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be below 5 for ok fit (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004) or below 3 for acceptable fit (Kline,
1998). Additional goodness of fit indices include Normed Fit Index, Incremental Fit
Index, Tucker-Lewis Index, and Comparative Fit Index. Previous research have set the
general guideline that these statistics should be greater than 0.90 (Bentler & Bonett,
1980; Bentler, 1992; Chin & Todd, 1995); however, more stringent guidelines have
suggested the cutoff criteria should be 0.95 (L. Hu & Bentler, 1999). Another fit index
evaluated in this study is the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation with a general
cutoff criteria for good fit is less than 0.08 (Browne & Cudeck, 1992); however, the more
stringent criteria is less than 0.06 (L. Hu & Bentler, 1999). See Chapter IV for the
assessment of goodness of fit.
Instrument validity
All constructs were tested for an acceptable level of reliability (≥ 0.70; Fornell &
Larcker, 1981; Gefen & Straub, 2005; Mackenzie et al., 2011; Nunnally & Bernstein,
1994; Straub et al., 2004). Initial reliability scores were obtained through reliability
analysis by computing composite reliability.
Convergent and discriminant validity of the measures were then assessed using
confirmatory factor analysis. Convergent validity is when items of the same construct
should correlate at a significant level with each other (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Peter,
1981; Straub et al., 2004). Item loadings greater than 0.70 and AVE above 0.50 indicate
convergent validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Gefen & Straub, 2005). Discriminant
validity states that items of one construct do not significantly correlate with items of
another construct (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Peter, 1981; Straub et al., 2004).
Discriminant validity is confirmed by creating the square root of average variance
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explained statistics and comparing them against correlation measures of other constructs
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Gefen et al., 2000; Warkentin et al., 2011).The results of
instrument validity for the main study are presented in Chapter IV.
Common method variance
Additionally, I checked for systematic bias that occurs when both the predictor
and outcome variables are collected at a single point in time rather than longitudinally.
This bias, also known as common method variance, can be addressed both procedurally
and statistically (Podsakoff et al., 2003); however, procedural (proactive) remedies are
more important (Burton-Jones, 2009; H. A. Richardson, Simmering, & Sturman, 2009).
During scale development and evaluation procedures, it is necessary to examine common
method effects that are possible due to source or rater, item characteristics, item context,
and measurement context (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Scenarios and scales developed for
this study underwent extensive expert panel reviews as suggested in previous research
(Petter, Straub, & Rai, 2007; Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004) to address these sources
of common method effects and ensure realism, content validity, and face validity.
Participant responses remained confidential to encourage honest responses and reduce the
effects of common method variance. To statistically address common method variance, I
included a single unmeasured latent method factor in my analysis. Podsakoff et al. (2003)
specifies that this unmeasured latent method factor should have a relationship with every
scale item to account for any systematic bias due to method. The variance of this
unmeasured latent method factor is set to one and regression weights for all relationships
to this variable are constrained equally. A confirmatory factor analysis was performed
with and without a common method factor to determine the presence of common method
72

variance. In order to provide sufficient evidence that common method variance is not a
substantial concern, results of the analysis should indicate no significant difference (χ2/df
< 3.84). The results for common method variance are presented in Chapter IV.
Data analysis
In order to estimate the sample size needed to test for differences between the two
groups, I conducted a power analysis using the statistical tool G*Power. According to
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner,
2007), the total required sample size to examine the differences between the two groups
using analysis of variance tests with an effect size of 0.25, alpha of 0.05, and power of
0.95 is 210 responses, or 105 per group. The total usable sample size for the main study
was 331 which far exceeds the minimum required sample size indicating relatively good
power. To determine differences between groups, group means were compared for any
differences using SPSS 21. See results of this analysis in Chapter IV.
Additionally, in order to test the relationships among constructs, data analysis was
conducted using structural equation modeling in AMOS 22 using the two-step approach
identified by Anderson & Gerbing (1988): (1) exploratory factor analysis and (2)
confirmatory factor analysis. Structural equation modeling is a second generation
statistical modelling technique that is better than comparable multiple regression
techniques (Bullock, Harlow, & Mulaik, 1994; Gefen et al., 2000; Kelloway, 1998)
because it enables researchers to “answer a set of interrelated research questions in a
single, systematic, and comprehensive analysis” (Gefen et al., 2000). For example,
measurement errors are an integral part of the model and factor analysis is combined in
one operation with hypothesis testing (Gefen et al., 2000). Therefore, this type of analysis
73

is appropriate for testing the theoretically justified model. Using this statistical package, I
assessed the measurement model to examine reliability and convergent and discriminant
validity. In addition, I determined predictive validity through the assessment of the
structural model. See results of this analysis in Chapter IV.
Summary
In this chapter, I detailed the instrument design including the use of the classical
experimental design, the experimental procedure used to collect data, and the
measurement instrument with its items and constructs. Next, I described the two-phase
investigation conducted to explore the phenomena of interest through the use of a
preliminary investigation and a primary investigation. In the preliminary investigation, I
discussed the expert panel reviews, pretest, and pilot studies conducted to determine the
validity and reliability of the instrument and its items. In the primary investigation, I
described the laboratory experiment including the sampling frame, model fit, instrument
validity, common method variance, and data analysis. The next chapter presents the
results from the statistical analyses for both the preliminary investigation and main
investigation.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

In this chapter, I discuss the results from my data collection. First, I describe the
results of the pilot studies including demographic frequencies and percentages, reliability,
and construct validity. Then, I detail the results of the main study including demographic
frequencies and percentages, reliability, construct validity, model fit, and common
method variance.
Pilot study I
Prior to conducting the main study, several pilot studies were conducted to assess
reliability and validity of the constructs used to measure the phenomena. In the first pilot
study, a sample of 111 undergraduate students from the College of Business at
Mississippi State University participated in the experiment. A total of 45 items were
included in the two-part questionnaire related to organizational injustice, negative
affective absorption, negative affective flow, and attitude toward information security
policy. The sample was 52% male with the average age of 19.85. Seventy-two percent
indicated that their ethnicity was white, 26.1% indicated it was black or African
American, and 1.8% indicated it was Asian. Regarding the highest level of education
completed, 91.9% have completed high school and the remaining 8.1% have received
their associate’s degree. Each participant was rewarded extra credit for their participation;
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therefore, perceptions of their actual grade and importance of extra credit were collected.
Five percent of the sample believed their grade was an A, 56.8% believed it was a B,
28.8% believed it was a C, 7.2% believed it was a D, and 1.8% believed it was an F.
When examining the importance of extra credit to the respondent, 87.3% reported that
earning extra credit was very important, 9% reported that it was important, and 3.6%
reported that it was moderately important. See Table 4.1 for a list of these demographics.
Table 4.1

Demographic frequency and percentages (n = 111) for pilot study I

Variable
Grade: To the best
of your knowledge,
what is your current
grade in the class?
Extra credit: How
important is earning
extra credit to you?
Gender: What is
your gender?
Education: What is
the highest level of
education you have
completed?
Ethnicity: What is
your ethnicity?

Age: Please select
your age.

Measure
Frequency Percentage
A
6
5.4%
B
63
56.8%
C
32
28.8%
D
8
7.2%
F
2
1.8%
Not important
97
87.3%
Somewhat important
10
9%
Moderately important
4
3.6%
Important
0
0%
Very important
0
0%
Male
57
52%
Female
54
48%
High school
102
91.9%
Associate’s degree
9
8.1%
Bachelor’s degree
0
0%
Master’s degree
0
0%
Doctorate/professional degree
0
0%
Other
0
0%
American Indian or Alaska Native
0
0%
Asian
2
1.8%
Black or African American
29
26.1%
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
0
0%
White
80
72.1%
18-100
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Average: 19.85

Reliability scores were obtained using SPSS 21 to compute Cronbach’s Alpha.
The results from the pilot test indicate that all constructs for both groups exhibited an
acceptable level of reliability (see table 4.2; α ≥ .70; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).
Convergent validity and discriminant validity were assessed with an exploratory factor
analysis using principal components analysis and varimax rotation in SPSS 21 (Hair et
al., 2010). Convergent validity is demonstrated when items of the same construct load on
the same factor with item loadings greater than 0.70 (Straub et al., 2004) and discriminant
validity is demonstrated when items cross-load on different factors with item loadings
less than 0.40 (Hair et al., 2010). In this first pilot study, convergent and discriminant
validity was established for all constructs in both groups except the organizational
injustice constructs, specifically procedural injustice (see Table 4.3 and Table 4.4).
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Table 4.2

Cronbach’s Alpha for pilot study I

Experimental Group (n = 56)
Control Group (n = 55)
Cronbach’s
Cronbach’s
Cronbach’s
Cronbach’s
Item
Alpha if Item
Alpha if Item
Alpha
Alpha
Deleted
Deleted
NAA1
0.929
0.911
NAA2
0.926
0.844
0.901
0.799
NAA3
0.902
0.866
DINJ1
0.833
0.949
DINJ2
0.870
0.951
DINJ3
0.887
0.852
0.961
0.950
DINJ4
0.880
0.950
DINJ5
0.873
0.958
PINJ1
0.723
0.745
PINJ2
0.683
0.726
0.708
0.782
PINJ3
0.600
0.772
PINJ4
0.551
0.665
IINJ1
0.743
0.865
IINJ2
0.832
0.868
0.925
0.900
IINJ3
0.675
0.907
FINJ1
0.789
0.888
FINJ2
0.820
0.909
0.863
0.925
FINJ3
0.875
0.920
FINJ4
0.808
0.892
NAF1
0.908
0.950
NAF2
0.935
0.886
0.969
0.948
NAF3
0.921
0.962
ATT1
0.922
0.862
ATT2
0.926
0.822
0.945
0.887
ATT3
0.931
0.844
ATT4
0.932
0.890
NAA = Negative Affective Absorption; DINJ = Perceived Distributive Injustice; PINJ =
Perceived Procedural Injustice; IINJ = Perceived Interpersonal Injustice; FINJ =
Perceived Informational Injustice; NAF = Negative Affective Flow; ATT = Attitude
toward Information Security Policy
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Table 4.3

Construct validity for experimental group in pilot study I (n = 56)
1
.861
.888
.845

2

3

Component
4

5

6

NAA1
NAA2
NAA3
DINJ1
.880
DINJ2
.717
DINJ3
.800
DINJ4
.640
.420
DINJ5
.797
PINJ1
.739
PINJ2
.580
PINJ3
.712
PINJ4
.549
.453
IINJ1
.871
IINJ2
.588
IINJ3
.842
FINJ1
.893
FINJ2
.728
FINJ3
.632
FINJ4
.899
NAF1
.841
NAF2
.850
NAF3
.864
ATT1
.932
ATT2
.918
ATT3
.920
ATT4
.899
NAA = Negative Affective Absorption; DINJ = Perceived Distributive Injustice; PINJ =
Perceived Procedural Injustice; IINJ = Perceived Interpersonal Injustice; FINJ =
Perceived Informational Injustice; NAF = Negative Affective Flow; ATT = Attitude
toward Information Security Policy
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Table 4.4

Construct validity for control group in pilot study I (n = 55)
1
.860
.907
.887

2

Component
3
4

5

6

NAA1
NAA2
NAA3
DINJ1
.879
DINJ2
.798
.416
DINJ3
.853
DINJ4
.783
DINJ5
.751
PINJ1
.474
.453
PINJ2
.497
.511
PINJ3
.576
PINJ4
.634
.471
IINJ1
.847
IINJ2
.770
IINJ3
.803
FINJ1
.905
FINJ2
.852
FINJ3
.717
FINJ4
.819
NAF1
.793
NAF2
.814
NAF3
.838
ATT1
.838
ATT2
.896
ATT3
.842
ATT4
.824
NAA = Negative Affective Absorption; DINJ = Perceived Distributive Injustice; PINJ =
Perceived Procedural Injustice; IINJ = Perceived Interpersonal Injustice; FINJ =
Perceived Informational Injustice; NAF = Negative Affective Flow; ATT = Attitude
toward Information Security Policy
Considering the validity issues with organizational injustice as indicated by the
data, procedural injustice and informational injustice scales were reevaluated and
reworded to partial out the differences between the two scales.
After establishing validity and reliability for the constructs in the model, I
conducted a t-test to determine whether there was a significant statistical difference
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between the frustration experienced by the individual and the group to which he or she
was assigned. Table 4.5 shows the descriptive statistics indicating a mean of 4.143 out of
5.000 for the experimental group and 2.618 out of 5.000 for the control group. Table 4.6
shows that the differences in frustration experienced between the two groups is
statistically significant indicating that individuals in the experimental group experienced
greater levels of frustration.
Table 4.5

Frustration descriptive statistics based on group for pilot study

Group
Experimental
Control

Table 4.6

N
56
55

Mean
4.143
2.618

Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
1.1189
.1495
1.4718
.1985

Independent samples test for frustration based on group for pilot study

Equal variances assumed
Yes
No

F
8.022

Sig.
0.006

t
6.151
6.136

df
109
100.81

Sig.
0.000
0.000

Next, I conducted a t-test to determine whether there was a statistical difference in
compliance behavior between the groups given the frustration they experienced. Table
4.7 shows the descriptive statistics indicating that 42.9% of those in the experimental
group shared their password and 30.9% of those in the control group shared their
password. Although individuals in the experimental group were more likely to share their
password, the results (see Table 4.8) of the t-test indicate that this difference wasn’t
statistically significant (p = 0.195).
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Table 4.7

Compliance descriptive statistics based on group for pilot study

Group
Experimental
Control

Table 4.8

N
56
55

Mean
0.429
0.309

Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
0.4994
.0667
0.4664
.0629

Independent samples test for compliance based on group for pilot study

Equal variances assumed
Yes
No

F
5.966

Sig.
0.016

t
1.302
1.303

df
109
108.73

Sig.
0.196
0.195

This non-significance may be because some people in the control group would
have experienced frustration regardless of the group they were assigned because of the
nature of the task; therefore, I conducted a t-test to determine whether there was a
statistical difference in compliance behavior based on frustration experienced. The
descriptive statistics (see Table 4.9) indicate that 50% of those who were very frustrated
or extremely frustrated didn’t share their password; whereas, 76.4% of those that were
not frustrated at all, somewhat frustrated, or moderately frustrated didn’t shared their
password. The results indicate that the level of frustration experienced ultimately
influenced compliance behavior (p = 0.004; see Table 4.10).
Table 4.9

Compliance descriptive statistics based on frustration experienced for the
pilot study

Group
Frustrated > 3
Frustrated <= 3

N
56
55

Mean
0.500
0.764

Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
0.5045
.0674
0.4288
.0578
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Table 4.10

Independent samples test for compliance base on frustration experienced the
for pilot study

Equal variances assumed
Yes
No

F
21.18

Sig.
0.000

t
2.964
2.968

df
109
106.81

Sig.
0.004
0.004

Pilot study II
After reexamination of the model, attitude toward information security policy was
broken into two constructs: attitude toward general information security policies and
attitude toward specific information security policies. Attitude toward general
information security policy was collected in the first part of the study and attitude toward
specific information security policy was collected after the actual experiment. A second
pilot study was conducted to ensure reliability of the attitude constructs. In this second
pilot study, a sample of 24 undergraduate students from the College of Business at
Mississippi State University participated in the experiment. All students were assigned to
the experimental group. Reliability scores were obtained as they were explained in the
first pilot test and the attitude constructs exhibited an acceptable level of reliability (see
Table 4.11).
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Table 4.11

Cronbach’s Alpha for attitudinal constructs in pilot study II

Item
Cronbach’s Alpha
Cronbach’s Alpha if Item Deleted
GATT1
0.876
GATT2
0.871
0.925
GATT3
0.902
GATT4
0.948
SATT1
0.848
SATT2
0.864
0.867
SATT3
0.787
SATT4
0.813
GATT = Attitude toward General Information Security Policy; SATT = Attitude toward
Specific Information Security Policy
Main study
The main study data were collected using a laboratory experiment as described in
Chapter III. The data were first analyzed to examine the sample characteristics, next the
data were assessed using exploratory factor analysis to determine reliability and construct
validity, and then the data were examined using two-step approach of confirmatory factor
analysis. The first approach examined the measurement model including model fit,
instrument validity, outliers, and common method variance. The second approach
examined the structural model including structural model fit, and path estimates. Finally,
the results were interpreted.
Sample characteristics
For the main study, a sample of 398 undergraduate students from the College of
Business at Mississippi State University participated in the experiment, but 67 student
responses were dropped because of incompleteness or due to response set – the tendency
of respondents to respond automatically and independent of item content (Andrich, 1978;
Rennie, 1982). This left a final sample of 331 students.
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A total of 45 items were included in the two-part questionnaire related to
organizational injustice, negative affective absorption, negative affective flow, attitude
toward general information security policy, and attitude toward specific information
security policy. The sample was 53.8% male with the average age of 21.38. Seventy-six
percent indicated that their ethnicity was white, 18.1% indicated it was black or African
American, 4.2% indicated it was Asian, and 0.9% indicated it was American Indian or
Alaska Native. Regarding the highest level of education completed, 78.8% have
completed high school, 18.4% have received their associate’s degree, and 1.9% have
received their bachelor’s degree. Each participant was rewarded extra credit for their
participation; therefore, perceptions of their actual grade, expected grade, and importance
of extra credit were collected. In this sample, 2.4% believed their grade was an A, 8.2%
believed it was a B, 24.2% believed it was a C, 40.8% believed it was a D, and 24.5%
believed it was an F. However, 74% expected to earn an A, 24.8% expected to earn a B,
and 1.2% expected to earn a C. When examining the importance of extra credit to the
respondent, 74.3% reported that earning extra credit was very important, 20.2% reported
that it was important, and 4.2% reported that it was moderately important, 0.9% reported
it was somewhat important, and 0.3% reported that it was not important. See Table 4.12
for a list of these demographics.
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Table 4.12

Demographic frequency and percentages (n = 331)

Variable
Grade: To the best
of your knowledge,
what is your current
grade in the class?
Expected Grade:
What grade do you
expect to earn in
class?
Extra credit: How
important is earning
extra credit to you?
Gender: What is
your gender?
Education: What is
the highest level of
education you have
completed?
Ethnicity: What is
your ethnicity?

Age: Please select
your age.

Measure
Frequency Percentage
A
7
2.4%
B
26
8.2%
C
76
24.2%
D
127
40.8%
F
80
24.5%
A
238
74.0%
B
74
24.8%
C
4
1.2%
D
0
0%
F
0
0%
Not important
1
0.3%
Somewhat important
3
0.9%
Moderately important
14
4.2%
Important
66
20.2%
Very important
232
74.3%
Male
176
53.8%
Female
140
46.2%
High school
249
79.5%
Associate’s degree
58
17.8%
Bachelor’s degree
6
1.8%
Master’s degree
0
0%
Doctorate/professional degree
0
0%
Other
3
0.9%
American Indian or Alaska Native
3
0.9%
Asian
14
4.2%
Black or African American
58
18.1%
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
0
0%
White
241
76.7%
18-100

Average: 21.38

Mean comparison
I conducted a t-test to determine whether group assignment had an impact on
frustration level. Table 4.13 shows the descriptive statistics indicating a mean of 3.17 out
of 5.00 for the experimental group and 1.92 out of 5.00 for the control group. Table 4.14
shows that the differences in frustration experienced between the two groups is
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statistically significant indicating that individuals in the experimental group experienced
greater levels of frustration.
Table 4.13

Frustration descriptive statistics based on group

Group
Experimental
Control

Table 4.14

N
172
159

Mean
3.17
1.92

Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
1.180
.090
1.172
.093

Independent samples test for frustration based on group

Equal variances assumed
Yes
No

F
0.786

Sig.
0.376

t
9.614
9.616

Df
329
327.30

Sig.
0.000
0.000

Next, I conducted a t-test to determine whether there was a statistical difference in
compliance behavior based on group assignment. Table 4.15 shows the descriptive
statistics indicating that 70% of those in the experimental group didn’t share their
password and 84% of those in the control group didn’t share their password. The data
show that the difference of information security policy compliance behavior between the
control group and the experimental group is statistically significant (p = 0.002; see Table
4.16). Therefore, individuals who were assigned to the experimental group were more
likely to share their password.
Table 4.15

Compliance descriptive statistics based on group

Group
Experimental
Control

N
172
159

Mean
0.70
0.84

Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
0.458
.035
0.365
.029
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Table 4.16

Independent samples test for compliance based on group

Equal variances assumed
Yes
No

F
39.724

Sig.
0.000

t
-3.043
-3.070

Df
329
322.16

Sig.
0.003
0.002

Exploratory factor analysis
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted to examine initial reliability scores and
initial construct validity using SPSS 21. Reliability scores were first obtained by
computing Cronbach’s Alpha. The results from the main study indicate that all constructs
for both groups exhibited an acceptable level of reliability (see Table 4.17; α ≥ .70;
Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Additionally, convergent and discriminant validity were
assessed using principal components analysis and varimax rotation in SPSS 21 (Hair et
al., 2010). Convergent validity is demonstrated when items load on the appropriate factor
with a value greater than 0.70 (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Peter, 1981; Straub et al., 2004),
and discriminant validity is demonstrated when the items cross-load less than 0.40 on all
other factors (Hair et al., 2010). Several issues with both convergent validity and
discriminant validity occurred, but mainly in the control group (see Table 4.18 and Table
4.19).
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Table 4.17

Cronbach’s Alpha for the main study

Item
NAA1
NAA2
NAA3
NAA4
NAA5
GATT1
GATT2
GATT3
GATT4
DINJ1
DINJ2
DINJ3
DINJ4
DINJ5
PINJ1
PINJ2
PINJ3
PINJ4
PINJ5
IINJ1
IINJ2
IINJ3
FINJ1
FINJ2
FINJ3
FINJ4
NAF1
NAF2
NAF3
NAF4
NAF5
SATT1
SATT2
SATT3
SATT4

Experiment Group (n = 172)
Cronbach’s
Cronbach’s
Alpha if Item
Alpha
Deleted
0.791
0.729
0.802
0.746
0.750
0.798
0.822
0.813
0.861
0.844
0.809
0.898
0.895
0.915
0.893
0.902
0.894
0.821
0.848
0.860
0.815
0.828
0.843
0.806
0.887
0.858
0.853
0.764
0.800
0.852
0.884
0.784
0.897
0.877
0.902
0.868
0.868
0.888
0.911
0.883
0.922
0.903
0.898

Control Group (n = 159)
Cronbach’s
Cronbach’s
Alpha if Item
Alpha
Deleted
0.811
0.758
0.815
0.745
0.772
0.802
0.855
0.855
0.900
0.881
0.890
0.946
0.946
0.957
0.941
0.951
0.948
0.890
0.913
0.919
0.892
0.894
0.913
0.835
0.868
0.819
0.789
0.851
0.874
0.905
0.905
0.870
0.934
0.917
0.935
0.913
0.913
0.921
0.875
0.843
0.905
0.858
0.928

DINJ = Perceived Distributive Injustice; PINJ = Perceived Procedural Injustice; IINJ = Perceived
Interpersonal Injustice; FINJ = Perceived Informational Injustice; NAA = Negative Affective
Absorption; NAF = Negative Affective Flow; GATT = Attitude toward General Information
Security Policy; SATT = Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy
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Table 4.18

Construct validity for the experimental group of the main study

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
NAA1
0.626
NAA2
0.802
NAA3
0.787
NAA4
0.810
NAA5
0.617
GATT1
0.835
GATT2
0.843
GATT3
0.797
GATT4
0.864
DINJ1
0.795
DINJ2
0.791
DINJ3
0.755
DINJ4
0.689
DINJ5
0.710
PINJ1
0.414
0.625
PINJ2
0.759
PINJ3
0.650
PINJ4
0.740
PINJ5
0.627
IINJ1
0.872
IINJ2
0.797
IINJ3
0.848
FINJ1
0.854
FINJ2
0.756
FINJ3
0.429
0.475
FINJ4
0.842
NAF1
0.744
NAF2
0.772
NAF3
0.797
NAF4
0.780
NAF2
0.731
SATT1
0.872
SATT2
0.924
SATT3
0.892
SATT4
0.892
NAA = Negative Affective Absorption; GATT = Attitude toward General Information
Security Policy; DINJ = Perceived Distributive Injustice; PINJ = Perceived Procedural
Injustice; IINJ = Perceived Interpersonal Injustice; FINJ = Perceived Informational
Injustice; NAF = Negative Affective Flow; SATT = Attitude toward Specific Information
Security Policy
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Table 4.19

Construct validity for the control group of the main study

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NAA1
0.654
NAA2
0.809
NAA3
0.823
NAA4
0.732
NAA5
0.677
GATT1
0.903
GATT2
0.900
GATT3
0.839
GATT4
0.829
DINJ1
0.612
0.599
DINJ2
0.509
0.732
DINJ3
0.592
0.646
DINJ4
0.581
0.619
DINJ5
0.559
0.675
PINJ1
0.845
PINJ2
0.745
PINJ3
0.737
PINJ4
0.789
PINJ5
0.691
IINJ1
0.744
IINJ2
0.404
0.705
IINJ3
0.863
FINJ1
0.859
FINJ2
0.819
FINJ3
0.730
FINJ4
0.858
NAF1
0.419
0.627
NAF2
0.503
0.690
NAF3
0.462
0.740
NAF4
0.499
0.675
NAF2
0.781
SATT1
0.877
SATT2
0.919
SATT3
0.911
SATT4
0.779
NAA = Negative Affective Absorption; GATT = Attitude toward General Information
Security Policy; DINJ = Perceived Distributive Injustice; PINJ = Perceived Procedural
Injustice; IINJ = Perceived Interpersonal Injustice; FINJ = Perceived Informational
Injustice; NAF = Negative Affective Flow; SATT = Attitude toward Specific Information
Security PolicyCronbach’s Alpha for the alternative model
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Given the reflective nature of these constructs, measures can be removed to
improve construct validity without affecting content validity (Petter et al., 2007).
Therefore, the following items were removed to establish construct validity: two items
from the negative affective absorption scale, one item from the negative affective flow
scale, and one item from the informational injustice scale. Also, the procedural injustice
construct was also removed from the model because of high cross-loadings with
distributive injustice and informational injustice. Reliability was reassessed with the
remaining items, indicating an acceptable level of reliability (see Table 4.20). Convergent
validity and discriminant validity were reassessed as well, indicating that each construct
had convergent and discriminant validity in the experimental group and all but
informational injustice and negative affective flow (although not enough to cause
concern) had convergent and discriminant validity in the control group (see Table 4.21
and 4.22).
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Table 4.20

Cronbach’s Alpha after item removal

Experimental Group (n = 172)
Control Group (n = 159)
Cronbach’s
Cronbach’s
Cronbach’s
Item
Alpha if Item Cronbach’s Alpha Alpha if Item
Alpha
Deleted
Deleted
NAA2
0.769
0.704
NAA3
0.812
0.733
0.808
0.746
NAA4
0.726
0.761
GATT1
0.822
0.855
GATT2
0.813
0.855
0.861
0.900
GATT3
0.844
0.881
GATT4
0.809
0.890
DINJ1
0.898
0.946
DINJ2
0.895
0.946
DINJ3
0.915
0.893
0.957
0.941
DINJ4
0.902
0.951
DINJ5
0.894
0.948
IINJ1
0.806
0.835
IINJ2
0.887
0.858
0.868
0.819
IINJ3
0.853
0.789
FINJ1
0.799
0.819
FINJ2
0.884
0.887
0.905
0.897
FINJ4
0.816
0.865
NAF2
0.869
0.921
NAF3
0.851
0.908
0.897
0.934
NAF4
0.855
0.908
NAF5
0.890
0.920
SATT1
0.911
0.875
SATT2
0.883
0.843
0.922
0.905
SATT3
0.903
0.858
SATT4
0.898
0.928
NAA = Negative Affective Absorption; GATT = Attitude toward General Information
Security Policy; DINJ = Perceived Distributive Injustice; IINJ = Perceived Interpersonal
Injustice; FINJ = Perceived Informational Injustice; NAF = Negative Affective Flow;
SATT = Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy
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Table 4.21

Construct validity for the experimental group after item removal

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NAA2
0.798
NAA3
0.835
NAA4
0.868
GATT1
0.842
GATT2
0.845
GATT3
0.796
GATT4
0.863
DINJ1
0.815
DINJ2
0.828
DINJ3
0.835
DINJ4
0.735
DINJ5
0.791
IINJ1
0.882
IINJ2
0.828
IINJ3
0.858
FINJ1
0.851
FINJ2
0.763
FINJ4
0.857
NAF2
0.799
NAF3
0.838
NAF4
0.826
NAF5
0.739
SATT1
0.878
SATT2
0.929
SATT3
0.893
SATT4
0.892
NAA = Negative Affective Absorption; GATT = Attitude toward General Information
Security Policy; DINJ = Perceived Distributive Injustice; IINJ = Perceived Interpersonal
Injustice; FINJ = Perceived Informational Injustice; NAF = Negative Affective Flow;
SATT = Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy
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Table 4.22

Construct validity for the control group after item removal

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
NAA2
0.877
NAA3
0.805
NAA4
0.790
GATT1
0.897
GATT2
0.902
GATT3
0.846
GATT4
0.830
DINJ1
0.874
DINJ2
0.841
DINJ3
0.875
DINJ4
0.852
DINJ5
0.858
IINJ1
0.795
IINJ2
0.729
IINJ3
0.877
FINJ1
0.498
0.723
FINJ2
0.558
0.575
FINJ4
0.457
0.779
NAF2
0.429
0.716
NAF3
0.782
NAF4
0.478
0.727
NAF5
0.804
SATT1
0.87
SATT2
0.922
SATT3
0.917
SATT4
0.782
NAA = Negative Affective Absorption; GATT = Attitude toward General Information
Security Policy; DINJ = Perceived Distributive Injustice; IINJ = Perceived Interpersonal
Injustice; FINJ = Perceived Informational Injustice; NAF = Negative Affective Flow;
SATT = Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy
Confirmatory factor analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis was assessed using structural equation modeling in
AMOS 22. Using this statistical package, I assessed both the measurement model to
determine reliability and convergent and discriminant validity and the structural model to
determine predictive validity.
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Measurement model evaluation
The measurement model (see Figure 4.1) was used to assess model fit, reliability,
convergent and discriminant validity, and common method variance.

Figure 4.1

Measurement model

Measurement model fit
According to previous research, χ2 should not be statistically significant to
establish good fit; however, the χ2 statistic is highly sensitive to sample size and is likely
to result in a significant result when the sample is large as was the sample in this study
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(Byrne, 2010; Kelloway, 1998). Instead, the χ2 index (χ2/df), considered one of the better
goodness of fit statistics (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004), should be below 5 for ok fit
(Schumacker & Lomax, 2004) or below 3 for acceptable fit (Kline, 1998). The χ2 index
statistic in this study met this criteria (see Table 4.23). Additional goodness of fit indices
include Normed Fit Index, Incremental Fit Index, Tucker-Lewis Index, and Comparative
Fit Index. Previous research have set the general guidelines that these statistics should be
greater than 0.90 (Bentler & Bonett, 1980; Bentler, 1992; Chin & Todd, 1995); however,
more stringent guidelines have suggested the cutoff criteria should be 0.95 (L. Hu &
Bentler, 1999). Another fit index evaluated in this study is the Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation. The general cutoff criteria for good fit is less than 0.08 (Browne &
Cudeck, 1992); however, the more stringent criteria is less than 0.06 (L. Hu & Bentler,
1999). Although a specific cutoff criteria for these statistics is still debated (L. Hu &
Bentler, 1999; Lance, Butts, & Michels, 2006; Marsh et al., 2004), all fit indices, except
the Normed Fit Index, suggest that the measurement model was a good fit to the data
based on general guidelines established by previous research (see Table 4.23).
Table 4.23

Model fit statistics for measurement model

Goodness of Fit Statistic

Recommended
Value
---≤ 3; ≤ 5
≥ .90
≥ .90
≥ .90
≥ .90
≤ .06; ≤ .08

χ2
Degrees of freedom (df)
χ2 statistical significance (p-value)
χ2 Index (χ2/df)
Normed Fit Index (NFI)
Incremental Fit Index (IFI)
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA)
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Calculated
Value
721.01
556
0.000
1.297
0.895
0.974
0.969
0.973
0.030

Measurement invariance
Since this study evaluated two different groups, responses need to be invariant
between the two groups to draw conclusions regarding latent mean differences
(Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). Measurement invariance refers to the consistency of
measurement across some specified group demarcation (Ellis, Aguirre-Urreta, Sun, &
Marakas, 2008). Current information systems literature indicates the need to conduct
comprehensive research that includes measurement invariance (Aguirre-Urreta &
Marakas, 2012; Ellis et al., 2008). In this study, I established configural invariance and
metric invariance. Configural invariance is established when the unconstrained model has
good fit (Ellis et al., 2008). Therefore, configural invariance is established because the
unconstrained model has good fit as indicated previously. I found good fit in this model
as (1) χ2/df is under 3, (2) , Incremental Fit Index, Tucker-Lewis Index, and Comparative
Fit Index are greater than 0.90, and (3) Root Mean Square Error of Approximation is less
than 0.07. Additionally, metric invariance is established when the measurement weights
χ2 statistic is not significant (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). The results from a chisquare difference test indicate metric invariance between the groups (df = 19; χ2 = 21.72;
p-value = 0.299).
Instrument validity
All constructs had an acceptable level (≥ 0.70) of reliability (Fornell & Larcker,
1981; Gefen & Straub, 2005; Mackenzie et al., 2011; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994; Straub
et al., 2004). Initial reliability scores were obtained through reliability analysis by
computing composite reliability (see Table 4.24).
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Convergent and discriminant validity of the measures were then assessed using
confirmatory factor analysis in AMOS 22. Convergent validity is demonstrated when
items of the same construct correlate at a significant level with each other (Campbell &
Fiske, 1959; Peter, 1981; Straub et al., 2004). Item loadings greater than 0.70 and average
variance extracted above 0.50 indicate convergent validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981;
Gefen et al., 2000; Gefen & Straub, 2005). All items loaded significantly on their higher
order construct with loadings greater than 0.70. Additionally, all constructs had an
average variance extracted greater than 0.50. Therefore, the results indicate convergent
validity. See Table 4.24 for a complete list of items and loadings and Table 4.25 and
Table 4.26 for the average variance extracted.
Discriminant validity is present when items of one construct do not significantly
correlate with items of another construct (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Peter, 1981; Straub et
al., 2004). Discriminant validity is confirmed by creating the square root of average
variance extracted statistics and comparing them against correlation measures of other
constructs (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Gefen et al., 2000; Warkentin et al., 2011). The
square root of average variance extracted was greater than inter-construct correlations
(see Table 4.25 and Table 4.26); therefore, the results indicate discriminant validity.

99

Table 4.24

Factor loadings and composite reliability

Negative Affective Absorption
In general, negative emotions occupy my attention.
In general, it is hard for me to focus on something other
than my negative emotions.
In general, I become deeply involved with my negative
emotions.
Attitude toward General Information Security Policy
Complying with the requirements of an information security
policy is important.
Complying with the requirements of an information security
policy is beneficial.
Complying with the requirements of an information security
policy is helpful.
Complying with the requirements of an information security
policy is necessary.
Distributive Injustice
Based on the effort I put into this exercise, the extra credit I
received was unfair.
Based on the task I was assigned during this exercise, the
extra credit I received was unfair.
Based on the decisions I completed during this exercise, the
extra credit I received was.
Based on the stress I experienced during this exercise, the
extra credit I received was unfair.
Based on the training provided during the exercise, the
extra credit I received was unfair.
Interpersonal Injustice
During the exercise, I was not treated in a polite manner.
During the exercise, I was not treated with dignity.
During the exercise, I was not treated with respect.
Informational Injustice
The video presentation did not explain this exercise
thoroughly.
The video presentation explanations regarding this exercise
were unreasonable.
The video presentation did not sufficiently provide detailed
instructions about the exercise.
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Standardized factor
loadings (t-values)
Experimental Control
ρ = .813
ρ = .810
.74 (**)
.78 (**)
.79 (8.72)

.77 (8.49)

.77 (8.66)

.74 (8.31)

ρ = .861

ρ = .902

.78 (**)

.88 (**)

.80 (10.45)

.89 (14.69)

.71 (9.21)

.80 (12.47)

.82 (10.68)

.77 (11.83)

ρ = .916

ρ = .957

.81 (**)

.91 (**)

.83 (12.44)

.91 (18.42)

.85 (12.63)

.94 (20.43)

.81 (11.88)

.88 (16.94)

.85 (12.77)

.89 (17.70)

ρ = .888
.90 (**)
.83 (13.33)
.83 (13.36)
ρ = .888

ρ = .868
.79 (**)
.87 (11.47)
.82 (10.87)
ρ = .909

.90 (**)

.92 (**)

.78 (12.44)

.86 (15.46)

.87 (14.72)

.85 (15.29)

Table 4.24 (Continued)
Negative Affective Flow
ρ = .899
ρ = .936
During this exercise, negative emotions occupied my
.83 (**)
.87 (**)
attention.
During this exercise, it was hard to focus on something
.87 (13.58) .89 (15.90)
other than the negative emotions I experienced.
During this exercise, I became deeply involved with
.86 (13.34) .91 (16.62)
negative emotions.
During this exercise, I had no control over my negative
.76 (11.10) .86 (14.82)
emotions.
Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy
ρ = .924
ρ = .912
In this exercise, it was important that I not share my
.82 (**)
.86 (**)
password.
In this exercise, it was critical that I not share my password. .93 (14.91) .95 (17.00)
In this exercise, it was essential that I not share my
.87 (13.54) .89 (15.33)
password.
In this exercise, it was necessary that I not share my
.86 (13.32) .68 (9.83)
password.
Note: ρ = composite reliability; ** denotes a constrained relationship to 1.00 in order for
identiﬁcation
Table 4.25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Intercorrelations of constructs for the experimental group in the main study

Mean
2.41
4.02
3.66
2.32
3.78
2.95
4.15

S.D.
0.90
0.59
0.92
0.91
1.03
1.04
0.95

AVE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0.592 (.770)
0.609 -.107 (.780)
0.685 .201
.029 (.828)
0.727 .160 -.051 .440 (.852)
0.726 .209 -.122 .625
.228 (.852)
0.690 .375 -.051 .550
.503
.441 (.831)
0.752 -.106 .055
.042 -.047 .060
.124 (.867)

Note: S.D. = standard deviation; AVE = average variance extracted; values on the diagonal are the square
root of AVE
1 = Negative Affective Absorption
2 = Attitude toward General Information Security Policy
3 = Distributive Injustice
4 = Interpersonal Injustice
5 = Informational Injustice
6 = Negative Affective Flow
7 = Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy
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Table 4.26

Intercorrelations of constructs for the control group in the main study

Mean S.D. AVE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
2.44
0.85 0.587 (.766)
2
4.01
0.68 0.699 -.244 (.836)
3
2.49
1.05 0.818 .237 -.033 (.904)
4
1.74
0.74 0.687 .232 -.017 .598 (.829)
5
2.73
1.18 0.769 .210 -.079 .784
.585 (.877)
6
1.95
0.89 0.784 .369 -.113 .744
.706
.670 (.885)
7
4.12
0.97 0.725 -.265 .230 -.134 -.073 -.210 -.145 (.851)
Note: S.D. = standard deviation; AVE = average variance extracted; values on the
diagonal are the square root of AVE
1 = Negative Affective Absorption
2 = Attitude toward General Information Security Policy
3 = Distributive Injustice
4 = Interpersonal Injustice
5 = Informational Injustice
6 = Negative Affective Flow
7 = Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy
Common method variance
Additionally, I checked for the systematic bias known as common method
variance. Common method variance can be addressed both procedurally and statistically
(Podsakoff et al., 2003); however, procedural (proactive) remedies are more important
(Burton-Jones, 2009; H. A. Richardson et al., 2009). During scale development and
evaluation procedures, it is necessary to examine common method effects that are
possible due to source or rater, item characteristics, item context, and measurement
context (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Scenarios and scales developed for this study underwent
extensive expert panel reviews as suggested in previous research (Petter et al., 2007;
Straub et al., 2004) to address these sources of common method effects and ensure
realism, content validity, and face validity. Although this study was confidential,
identifiers were not associated with participants to encourage honest responses and
reduce the effects of common method variance. To statistically address common method
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variance, I followed the recommended guideline to include a single unmeasured latent
method factor. Podsakoff et al. (2003) specifies that this unmeasured latent method factor
should have a relationship with every scale item to account for any systematic bias due to
method. The variance of this unmeasured latent method factor is set to one and regression
weights for all relationships to this variable are constrained equally (see Figure 4.2). A
confirmatory factor analysis was performed with and without a common method factor to
determine the presence of common method variance. The results of the analysis showed
no significant difference because the chi-square difference was less than 3.84, providing
evidence that common method variance was not a substantial concern (see Table 4.27).

Figure 4.2

Measurement model with unmeasured latent method factor
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Table 4.27

Common method variance

Model
Unconstrained
Saturated model
Independence model

Without Method Variable
χ2
DF
721.01
556
.000
0
6847.98
650

With Method Variable
χ2
DF
720.16
555
.000
0
6847.98
650

Structural model evaluation
After analysis of the measurement model, I tested the structural model (see Figure
4.3). The assessment of the structural model is used to evaluate model fit and establish
predictive validity by determining the magnitude and direction of the relationships.
Essentially, this method is used to determine the significance of the path estimates
between constructs.
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Figure 4.3

Structural model

Structural model fit
Structural model fit is determined by examining the same fit statistics that were
examined in the measurement model. The data indicate good fit (see Table 4.28) because
all fit statistics, except Normed Fit Index, were all within recommended levels.
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Table 4.28

Model fit statistics for structural model

Goodness of Fit Statistic
χ2
Degrees of freedom (df)
χ2 statistical significance (p-value)
χ2 Index (χ2/df)
Normed Fit Index (NFI)
Incremental Fit Index (IFI)
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)

Recommended
Value
---≤ 3; ≤ 5
≥ .90
≥ .90
≥ .90
≥ .90
≤ .60; ≤ .80

Calculated
Value
729.83
560
0.000
1.303
0.893
0.973
0.968
0.973
0.030

Path estimates
Using the path model (see Figure 4.4), I obtained the standardized path estimates
for all but the first hypothesis (see Table 4.29). Hypothesis one was tested and supported
previously using a mean comparison test. For the experimental group, 5 out of 17 paths in
the path model were found statistically significant; however one of these paths was
significant in the opposite direction hypothesized. Negative affective absorption,
distributive injustice, interpersonal injustice, and informational injustice explained 40.1%
of the variance in negative affective flow. Negative affective flow explains 2.9% of the
total variance in attitude toward specific information security policy. Interpersonal
injustice and attitude toward specific information security policy explained 24.4% of the
variance in compliance with information security policy (see squared multiple
correlations in Table 4.29).
For the control group, 6 out of 17 paths in the path model were found statistically
significant; however one of these paths was significant in the opposite direction
hypothesized. Negative affective absorption, distributive injustice, interpersonal injustice,
106

and informational injustice explained 61.3% of the variance in negative affective flow.
Informational injustice and attitude toward general information security policy explained
7.1% of the total variance in attitude toward specific information security policy. Also,
interpersonal injustice, negative affective flow, and attitude toward specific information
security policy explained 20.3% of the variance in compliance with information security
policy (see squared multiple correlations in Table 4.29).

Figure 4.4

Path model
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Table 4.29

Path estimates, t-values, and squared multiple correlations

Experimental Group
Control Group
Std.
Std.
t-value p-value
t-value p-value
Estimate
Estimate
H2A: ↑DINJ
→
↑NAF
.311
3.563
***
.331
5.087
***
H2B: ↑PINJ
→
↑NAF
------H2C: ↑IINJ
→
↑NAF
.327
4.419
***
.389
5.385
***
H2D: ↑FINJ
→
↑NAF
.149
2.028
.043*
.105
1.847
n.s.
H3A: ↑DINJ
→ ↓SATT -.061
-0.568
n.s.
.040
0.341
n.s.
H3B: ↑PINJ
→ ↓SATT
------H3C: ↑IINJ
→ ↓SATT -.107
-1.174
n.s.
.052
0.394
n.s.
H3D: ↑FINJ
→ ↓SATT .032
0.362
n.s.
-.162
-1.674
n.s.
H4A: ↑DINJ
→ ↓COMP -.056
-1.238
n.s.
-.010
-0.247
n.s.
H4B: ↑PINJ
→ ↓COMP
------H4C: ↑IINJ
→ ↓COMP .080
2.068 .039*Ϯ
.111
2.391 .017*Ϯ
H4D: ↑FINJ
→ ↓COMP -.017
-0.474
n.s.
-.039
-1.155
n.s.
H5:
↑NAA
→
↑NAF
.235
3.333
***
.157
2.946 .003**
H6:
↑NAF
→ ↓SATT .165
1.903
n.s.
-.040
-0.308
n.s.
H7:
↑NAF
→ ↓COMP -.035
-0.938
n.s.
-.093
-2.044 .041*
H8: ↑GATT → ↑SATT .111
0.899
n.s.
.265
2.412 .016**
H9: ↑ SATT → ↑COMP .230
7.095
***
.124
4.548
***
Squared Multiple Correlations
NAF
0.401
0.613
SATT
0.029
0.071
COMP
0.244
0.203
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; Ϯ = significant in the opposite direction
hypothesized; NAA = Negative Affective Absorption; GATT = Attitude toward General
Information Security Policy; DINJ = Perceived Distributive Injustice; IINJ = Perceived
Interpersonal Injustice; FINJ = Perceived Informational Injustice; NAF = Negative
Affective Flow; SATT = Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy; COMP =
Information Security Policy Compliance
Hypothesized Relationship

Interpretation
For the 18 hypotheses presented in Chapter II, the results indicate support for 6
hypotheses in the experimental group and support for 7 hypotheses in the control group.
Additionally, although in the opposite direction hypothesized, one additional hypothesis
was supported in both the experimental group and control group (see Table 4.30). Figure
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4.5 and Figure 4.6 display the proposed model with the parameter estimates, p-values,
and variance explained for both groups.
The data indicate that individuals who experience frustrating tasks are less likely
to comply with information security policy (H1). H2A and H2C were supported,
indicating that distributive and interpersonal injustice positively influenced negative
affective flow. H2D was partially supported, indicating that informational injustice leads
to negative affective flow for individuals in the experimental group. H3A, H3C, and H3D
were not supported as the path parameters demonstrated that organizational injustice had
no effect on attitude toward specific information security policy. H4A, H4C, and H4D
were not supported because none of the path parameters between organizational injustice
and information security policy compliance were significant in the right direction. The
results confirm H5 and indicate that individuals with high levels of negative affective
absorption experience high levels of negative affective flow. H6 was not supported,
indicating that negative affective flow does not lead to attitude toward specific
information security policy. H7 was partially supported, indicating that negative affective
flow only influenced compliance with information security policy for the control group.
The results indicate that, for the control group, an individual’s attitude toward general
information security policy influences attitude toward specific information security
policy (H8). Finally, individuals with a positive attitude toward specific information
security policies were more likely to comply with information security policy (H9). All
these results are discussed further in Chapter V.
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Table 4.30

Hypotheses and support

HO Structural Relationship
Supported?
(ISP = information security policy)
Experimental Control
H1 Individuals who are subjected to frustrating tasks are
Yes
Yes
less likely to comply with ISP.
H2A Perceived distributive injustice is positively related
Yes
Yes
to negative affective flow.
H2B Perceived procedural injustice is positively related to
--negative affective flow.
H2C Perceived interpersonal injustice is positively related
Yes
Yes
to negative affective flow.
H2D Perceived informational injustice is positively
Yes
No
related to negative affective flow.
H3A Perceived distributive injustice is negatively related
No
No
to attitude toward specific ISP.
H3B Perceived procedural injustice is negatively related
--to attitude toward specific ISP.
H3C Perceived interpersonal injustice is negatively related
No
No
to attitude toward specific ISP.
H3D Perceived informational injustice is negatively
No
No
related to attitude toward specific ISP.
H4A Perceived distributive injustice is negatively related
No
No
to ISP compliance.
H4B Perceived procedural injustice is negatively related
--to ISP compliance.
H4C Perceived interpersonal injustice is negatively related
No
No
to ISP compliance.
H4D Perceived informational injustice is negatively
No
No
related to ISP compliance.
H5 Negative affective absorption is positively related to
Yes
Yes
negative affective flow.
H6 Negative affective flow is negatively related to
No
No
attitude toward specific ISP.
H7 Negative affective flow is negatively related to ISP
No
Yes
compliance.
H8 Attitude toward general ISP is positively related to
No
Yes
attitude toward specific ISP.
H9 Attitude toward specific ISP is positively related to
Yes
Yes
ISP compliance.
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Figure 4.5

Research model with significant path coefficients for experimental group

Figure 4.6

Research model with significant path coefficients for control group
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Summary
In this chapter, I discussed the results of the pilot studies. Next, I indicated the
changes that were implemented prior to the main data collection in order to increase
reliability and validity. In the main study, I conducted an exploratory factor analysis by
following information systems research guidelines (Gefen & Straub, 2005; Mackenzie et
al., 2011; Straub et al., 2004) to determine the reliability and convergent and discriminant
validity of my constructs.
Through structural equation modeling in AMOS version 22, I conducted
confirmatory factor analysis by following the two-step approach identified by Anderson
& Gerbing (1988) to first assess the measurement model and then the structural model.
Confirmatory factor analysis enabled me to confirm the reliability, convergent validity,
and discriminant validity of my instrument items. In addition, I tested the 18
hypothesized relationships and the results indicated support for six hypotheses in the
experimental group and seven hypotheses in the control group. Confirmatory factor
analysis allowed me to account for measurement error while assessing model fit and
controlling for common method variance. Common method variance was assessed using
the unmeasured latent variable (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The results of Chapter IV are
further discussed in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

This dissertation has explored the role of affective processes, in conjunction with
cognitive processes, on information security policy compliance behavior. In this research,
I first conducted a thorough literature review where I detailed cognitive theories such as
planned behavior, rational choice, deterrence, neutralization, absorption, flow, and
cognitive absorption and indicated where these theories may have fallen short in
predicting actual compliance behavior. Next, I examined affective theories such as
affective events theory to fill in the missing gaps where I identified two constructs that
could impact cognitive processes: affective absorption (i.e. the trait or disposition to
become deeply involved with one’s emotions) and affective flow (i.e. the state of deep
involvement with one’s emotions). From these foundational theories, I created a
conceptual research model with supporting hypotheses to evaluate what impacts attitude
toward and compliance with information security policies. Then, I tested the conceptual
research model using the classical experimental design through a laboratory experiment.
Prior to collecting data for the main investigation, I conducted a preliminary investigation
which was composed of expert panel reviews, a pre-test, and pilot studies to ensure
measurement reliability and validity. This preliminary investigation resulted in changes
to improve the validity and reliability of the instrument. During the main investigation,
the proposed model and hypotheses were tested and the data indicated good support for
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six hypotheses in the experimental group and support for seven hypotheses in the control
group. Interpretation of the results was provided. Finally, the remainder of this
dissertation presents post-hoc analysis, implications to both theory and practice,
limitations, and future research.
Post-hoc analysis
Additional models were explored to offer a better explanation regarding the lack
of support for several hypotheses in the original model. A theory-driven alternative
model with an additional construct, future information security policy noncompliance
intention, is proposed to replace the original model. In this section, I detail the literature
review, item generation, and data collection of future information security policy
noncompliance intention. In addition, data for this alternative model were examined as a
set of treatments to ensure an equal distribution of frustration experienced rather than a
laboratory experiment as specified in the original model. Since participants were grouped
based on the frustration they experienced, one exercise was used to induce more
frustration to ensure relatively equal sample sizes between the groups. Therefore, this
alternative model explored the impact of each construct on subsequent constructs based
on the frustration individuals experienced. Any decision to re-specify the model during
post hoc analysis requires conducting exploratory factor analysis again (Byrne, 2010;
Hair et al., 2010). Therefore, I conducted exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory
factor analysis for the new alternative model. Finally, in this section, the control variables
of this study were examined for significant effects on the relationships in this alternative
model.
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Alternative model
After further investigation regarding the non-significant relationships of several
hypotheses in the original model, an alternative model is proposed to replace the original
model (see Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1). This new model includes an additional construct
(i.e. future information security policy noncompliance intention). The addition of this
construct is driven by the theory of planned behavior and theory of reasoned action which
indicate that attitudes lead to intentions (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Also,
previously hypothesized relationships between organizational injustice and attitude
toward specific information security policy and information security policy compliance
were removed.

Figure 5.1

Proposed alternative model
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Table 5.1

Hypotheses and structural relationships

PO Structural Relationship (ISP = information security policy)
P1 Individuals who are subjected to frustrating tasks are less likely to comply with
ISP.
P2A Perceived distributive injustice is positively related to negative affective flow.
P2B Perceived procedural injustice is positively related to negative affective flow.
P2C Perceived interpersonal injustice is positively related to negative affective flow.
P2D Perceived informational injustice is positively related to negative affective flow.
P3 Attitude toward general ISP is positively related to attitude toward specific ISP.
P4 Attitude toward specific ISP is positively related to ISP compliance.
P5 Attitude toward specific ISP is negatively related to future ISP compliance
intention.
P6 Negative affective absorption is positively related to negative affective flow.
P7 Negative affective flow is negatively related to ISP compliance.
P8 Negative affective flow is positively related to future ISP compliance intention.

Future information security policy noncompliance intention
The theory of planned behavior explains that an individual’s attitude leads to
intentions which ultimately leads to behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
Since collecting behavioral intention in the context of information security is prone to
measurement issues (Crossler et al., 2013), information security policy compliance was
directly measured in this dissertation. Given that actual compliance was directly
measured, collecting intention afterwards proved inappropriate; therefore, the
participants’ future information security policy compliance intention was collected
instead.
The items for this construct were adapted to a future context from various
behavioral information security studies that explored compliance intention (Bulgurcu et
al., 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Hosack et al., 2009; Siponen et al., 2007; Warkentin et
al., 2011). The items with their associated item ID are listed in Table 5.2 and were
assessed using a fully anchored five-point Likert agreement scale (See Appendix A). The
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responses to these items were collected immediately after the participant answered the
organizational injustice, affective flow, and attitude toward specific information security
policy items. Additionally, these items did not warrant an additional data collection as
they were collected in both the pilot and main studies.
Table 5.2

Future information security policy noncompliance intention

Item ID
Item
FINT1 If I experienced a similar situation as this exercise in a workplace
environment, I am certain I would reveal my password.
FINT2 If I experienced a similar situation as this exercise in a workplace
environment, I expect I would share my password.
FINT4 If I experienced a similar situation as this exercise in a workplace
environment, I predict I would divulge my password

Source
Developed
for this
study with
adaptations
from
behavioral
intention
scales.

Mean comparison
A t-test was conducted to determine whether there was a statistical difference in
compliance behavior based on frustration experienced. The descriptive statistics (see
Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2) indicate that 68% of those who were moderately frustrated,
very frustrated, or extremely frustrated did not share their password; whereas, 85% of
those who were not frustrated at all or somewhat frustrated did not share their password.
The results indicate that the level of frustration experienced ultimately influenced
compliance behavior (p = 0.001; see Table 5.4). This confirms the first proposed
alternative hypothesis (Note: this hypotheses is identical in the original model) that
individuals who are subjected to frustrating tasks are less likely to comply with
information security policies.
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Table 5.3

Compliance descriptive statistics based on group

Group
Frustrated >= 3
Frustrated < 3
Table 5.4

N
155
176

Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
0.466
.037
0.361
.027

Independent samples test for compliance based on group

Equal variances assumed
Yes
No

Figure 5.2

Mean
0.68
0.85

F
52.085

Sig.
0.000

t
-3.569
-3.513

Df
329
288.83

Sig.
0.000
0.001

Count per frustration level experienced

Exploratory factor analysis
Following the same guidelines described in Chapter IV, reliability scores were
first obtained and all constructs for both groups exhibited an acceptable level of
reliability (see Table 5.5; α ≥ .70; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).
To assess convergent validity and discriminant validity, an exploratory factor
analysis was conducted using principal components analysis and varimax rotation in
SPSS 21 (Hair et al., 2010). The data demonstrate convergent and discriminant validity
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for all constructs in both groups, except informational injustice (although barely) in the
not frustrated group (see Table 5.6 and Table 5.7). The items were not removed from this
study because confirmatory factor analysis did not indicate any convergent or
discriminant validity issues (see below).
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Table 5.5

Cronbach’s Alpha for the alternative model

Frustrated Group (n = 155)
Non Frustrated Group (n = 176)
Cronbach’s
Cronbach’s
Cronbach’s
Item
Alpha if Item Cronbach’s Alpha Alpha if Item
Alpha
Deleted
Deleted
NAA2
0.774
0.679
NAA3
0.819
0.726
0.783
0.737
NAA4
0.753
0.701
GATT1
0.822
0.855
GATT2
0.819
0.853
0.864
0.898
GATT3
0.844
0.882
GATT4
0.820
0.882
DINJ1
0.910
0.925
DINJ2
0.914
0.915
DINJ3
0.926
0.905
0.937
0.914
DINJ4
0.914
0.932
DINJ5
0.904
0.924
IINJ1
0.807
0.808
IINJ2
0.884
0.853
0.855
0.808
IINJ3
0.844
0.778
FINJ1
0.805
0.796
FINJ2
0.886
0.876
0.891
0.894
FINJ4
0.833
0.833
NAF2
0.843
0.863
NAF3
0.841
0.805
0.884
0.873
NAF4
0.832
0.836
NAF5
0.884
0.843
SATT1
0.911
0.871
SATT2
0.875
0.847
0.922
0.901
SATT3
0.901
0.854
SATT4
0.908
0.917
FINT1
0.842
0.830
FINT2
0.901
0.819
0.901
0.835
FINT4
0.911
0.906
DINJ = Perceived Distributive Injustice; IINJ = Perceived Interpersonal Injustice; FINJ =
Perceived Informational Injustice; NAA = Negative Affective Absorption; NAF =
Negative Affective Flow; GATT = Attitude toward General Information Security Policy;
SATT = Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy; FINT = Future
Information Security Policy Noncompliance Intention
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Table 5.6

Construct validity for the frustrated group

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
NAA2
0.825
NAA3
0.860
NAA4
0.847
GATT1
0.837
GATT2
0.831
GATT3
0.789
GATT4
0.860
DINJ1
0.863
DINJ2
0.801
DINJ3
0.833
DINJ4
0.802
DINJ5
0.832
IINJ1
0.898
IINJ2
0.816
IINJ3
0.863
FINJ1
0.844
FINJ2
0.780
FINJ4
0.835
NAF2
0.790
NAF3
0.805
NAF4
0.846
NAF5
0.698
SATT1
0.877
SATT2
0.906
SATT3
0.861
SATT4
0.854
FINT1
0.907
FINT2
0.913
FINT4
0.880
DINJ = Perceived Distributive Injustice; IINJ = Perceived Interpersonal Injustice; FINJ =
Perceived Informational Injustice; NAA = Negative Affective Absorption; NAF =
Negative Affective Flow; GATT = Attitude toward General Information Security Policy;
SATT = Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy; FINT = Future
Information Security Policy Noncompliance Intention
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Table 5.7

Construct validity for not frustrated group

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
NAA2
0.840
NAA3
0.804
NAA4
0.821
GATT1
0.895
GATT2
0.897
GATT3
0.844
GATT4
0.850
DINJ1
0.857
DINJ2
0.852
DINJ3
0.877
DINJ4
0.794
DINJ5
0.811
IINJ1
0.802
IINJ2
0.764
IINJ3
0.870
FINJ1
0.413
0.811
FINJ2
0.516
0.588
FINJ4
0.825
NAF2
0.703
NAF3
0.818
NAF4
0.684
NAF5
0.822
SATT1
0.844
SATT2
0.900
SATT3
0.900
SATT4
0.798
FINT1
0.855
FINT2
0.862
FINT4
0.851
DINJ = Perceived Distributive Injustice; IINJ = Perceived Interpersonal Injustice; FINJ =
Perceived Informational Injustice; NAA = Negative Affective Absorption; NAF =
Negative Affective Flow; GATT = Attitude toward General Information Security Policy;
SATT = Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy; FINT = Future
Information Security Policy Noncompliance Intention
Confirmatory factor analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis was then assessed using structural equation
modeling in AMOS 22. Using this statistical package, I assessed both the measurement
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model to determine reliability and convergent and discriminant validity and the structural
model to determine predictive validity.
Measurement model evaluation
The measurement model (see Figure 5.3) was used to assess model fit, reliability,
convergent and discriminant validity, and common method variance.

Figure 5.3

Alternative measurement model
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Measurement model fit
Measurement model fit was assessed as described in Chapter IV. The data
indicate good fit (see Table 5.8) because all fit statistics, except Normed Fit Index, were
within recommended levels.
Table 5.8

Model fit statistics for alternative measurement model

Goodness of Fit Statistic
χ2
Degrees of freedom (df)
χ2 statistical significance (p-value)
χ2 Index (χ2/df)
Normed Fit Index (NFI)
Incremental Fit Index (IFI)
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA)

Recommended
Value
---≤ 3; ≤ 5
≥ .90
≥ .90
≥ .90
≥ .90
≤ .06; ≤ .08

Calculated
Value
910.26
698
0.000
1.304
0.874
0.967
0.961
0.967
0.030

Measurement invariance
As described in Chapter IV, when evaluating two groups, responses need to be
invariant between the groups. Following the procedures discussed in Chapter IV, the data
of the alternative model indicate configural invariance and metric invariance. Configural
invariance was established because the unconstrained model had good fit. Additionally,
the results from a chi-square difference test indicate metric invariance between the groups
(df = 21; χ2 = 20.08; p-value = 0.516).
Instrument validity
All constructs had an acceptable level (≥ 0.70) of reliability (Fornell & Larcker,
1981; Gefen & Straub, 2005; Mackenzie et al., 2011; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994; Straub
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et al., 2004). Initial reliability scores were obtained through reliability analysis by
computing composite reliability (see Table 5.9).
Convergent and discriminant validity of the measures were then assessed using
confirmatory factor analysis as described in Chapter IV. Convergent validity was
established as all items loaded significantly on their higher order construct and all
standardized factor loadings were above 0.70 (see Table 5.9). Additionally, all constructs
had an average variance extracted above 0.50 (see Table 5.10 and Table 5.11).
Discriminant validity was confirmed as the square root of average variance extracted was
greater than inter-construct correlations (see Table 5.10 and Table 5.11).
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Table 5.9

Factor loadings and composite reliability

Negative Affective Absorption
In general, negative emotions occupy my attention.
In general, it is hard for me to focus on something other than
my negative emotions.
In general, I become deeply involved with my negative
emotions.
Attitude toward General Information Security Policy
Complying with the requirements of an information security
policy is important.
Complying with the requirements of an information security
policy is beneficial.
Complying with the requirements of an information security
policy is helpful.
Complying with the requirements of an information security
policy is necessary.
Distributive Injustice
Based on the effort I put into this exercise, the extra credit I
received was unfair.
Based on the task I was assigned during this exercise, the
extra credit I received was unfair.
Based on the decisions I completed during this exercise, the
extra credit I received was.
Based on the stress I experienced during this exercise, the
extra credit I received was unfair.
Based on the training provided during the exercise, the extra
credit I received was unfair.
Interpersonal Injustice
During the exercise, I was not treated in a polite manner.
During the exercise, I was not treated with dignity.
During the exercise, I was not treated with respect.
Informational Injustice
The video presentation did not explain this exercise
thoroughly.
The video presentation explanations regarding this exercise
were unreasonable.
The video presentation did not sufficiently provide detailed
instructions about the exercise.
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Standardized factor
loadings (t-values)
Not
Frustrated
Frustrated
ρ = .820
ρ = .784
.74 (**)
.77 (**)
.82 (8.49)

.69 (7.69)

.77 (8.37)

.75 (7.93)

ρ = .866

ρ = .900

.80 (**)

.87 (**)

.81 (10.35) .87 (14.73)
.73 (9.29) .79 (12.60)
.80 (10.21) .79 (12.65)
ρ = .927

ρ = .938

.83 (**)

.84 (**)

.83 (12.44) .91 (16.03)
.87 (13.48) .91 (15.97)
.83 (12.41) .80 (13.00)
.88 (13.61) .87 (14.97)
ρ = .885
ρ = .857
.88 (**)
.81 (**)
.83 (12.28) .82 (11.31)
.83 (12.25) .82 (11.25)
ρ = .889
ρ = .897
.90 (**)

.91 (**)

.80 (12.23) .83 (14.33)
.86 (13.62) .86 (15.22)

Table 5.9 (Continued)
Negative Affective Flow (General)
ρ = .886
ρ = .879
During this exercise, negative emotions occupied my
.84 (**)
.74 (**)
attention.
During this exercise, it was hard to focus on something other
.85 (12.45) .88 (11.35)
than the negative emotions I experienced.
During this exercise, I became deeply involved with negative
.85 (12.48) .81 (10.59)
emotions.
During this exercise, I had no control over my negative
.71 (9.79) .78 (10.18)
emotions.
Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy
ρ = .924
ρ = .907
In this exercise, it was important that I not share my password. .80 (**)
.86 (**)
In this exercise, it was critical that I not share my password. .96 (14.35) .93 (16.71)
In this exercise, it was essential that I not share my password. .88 (12.80) .88 (15.33)
In this exercise, it was necessary that I not share my password. .83 (11.82) .69 (10.40)
Future Information Security Policy Noncompliance
ρ = .904
ρ = .903
Intention
If I experienced a similar situation as this exercise in a
workplace environment, I am certain I would reveal my
.89 (**)
.92 (**)
password.
If I experienced a similar situation as this exercise in a
.94 (15.69) .90 (16.99)
workplace environment, I expect I would share my password.
If I experienced a similar situation as this exercise in a
workplace environment, I predict I would divulge my
.77 (12.12) .78 (13.41)
password.
Note: ** denotes a constrained relationship to 1.00 in order for identiﬁcation; ρ =
composite reliability
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Table 5.10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Intercorrelations of constructs for the frustrated group

Mean
2.61
3.99
3.80
2.42
3.90
3.22
4.03
2.15

S.D.
0.94
0.63
0.91
0.90
0.98
0.98
1.02
0.94

AVE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0.604 (.777)
0.617 -.212 (.785)
0.717 .054 .078 (.847)
0.719 .101 -.039 .414 (.848)
0.727 .105 -.035 .636 .286 (.853)
0.662 .239 -.057 .544 .451 .462 (.813)
0.752 -.149 .335 .178 .003 .112 .256 (.867)
0.759 .119 -.098 .036 .129 -.022 .172 -.264 (.871)

Note: S.D. = standard deviation; AVE = average variance extracted; values on the diagonal are the square
root of AVE
1 = Negative Affective Absorption
2 = Attitude toward General Information Security Policy
3 = Distributive Injustice
4 = Interpersonal Injustice
5 = Informational Injustice
6 = Negative Affective Flow
7 = Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy
8 = Future Information Security Policy Noncompliance Intention

Table 5.11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Intercorrelations of constructs for the not frustrated group

Mean
2.26
4.03
2.48
1.70
2.73
1.81
4.23
1.88

S.D.
0.78
0.63
0.96
0.71
1.15
0.68
0.89
0.77

AVE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0.549 (.741)
0.693 -.158 (.832)
0.751 .059 -.033 (.866)
0.666 .068 .001 .501 (.816)
0.745 .063 -.117 .740 .408 (.863)
0.647 .231 -.033 .577 .659 .539 (.804)
0.711 -.201 -.022 -.095 -.024 -.138 -.126 (.843)
0.757 .244 -.126 .268 .216 .334 .308 -.496 (.870)

Note: S.D. = standard deviation; AVE = average variance extracted; values on the diagonal are the square
root of AVE
1 = Negative Affective Absorption
2 = Attitude toward General Information Security Policy
3 = Distributive Injustice
4 = Interpersonal Injustice
5 = Informational Injustice
6 = Negative Affective Flow
7 = Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy
8 = Future Information Security Policy Noncompliance Intention
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Common method variance
To statistically address common method variance in the alternative model, I
included a single unmeasured latent method factor (see Figure 5.4). A confirmatory factor
analysis was performed with and without a common method factor to determine the
presence of common method variance (see Table 5.12). The results of the analysis
showed no significant difference because the chi-square difference was less than 3.84
providing evidence that common method variance is not a substantial concern.

Figure 5.4

Alternative measurement model
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Table 5.12

Common method variance

Model
Unconstrained
Saturated model
Independence model

Without Method Variable
χ2
DF
910.258
698
.000
0
7218.65
812

With Method Variable
χ2
DF
910.14
697
.000
0
7218.65
812

Structural model evaluation
After analysis of the measurement model, I tested the structural model (see Figure
5.5). The assessment of the structural model is used to evaluate model fit and establish
predictive validity by determining the magnitude and direction of the relationships.

Figure 5.5

Alternative structural model
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Structural model fit
Structural model fit was assessed as described in Chapter IV. The data indicate
good fit (see Table 5.13) because all fit statistics, except Normed Fit Index, were all
within recommended levels.
Table 5.13

Model fit statistics for structural model

Goodness of Fit Statistic
χ2
Degrees of freedom (df)
χ2 statistical significance (p-value)
χ2 Index (χ2/df)
Normed Fit Index (NFI)
Incremental Fit Index (IFI)
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)

Recommended
Value
---≤ 3; ≤ 5
≥ .90
≥ .90
≥ .90
≥ .90
≤ .60; ≤ .80

Calculated
Value
929.20
712
0.000
1.305
0.871
0.967
0.961
0.966
0.030

Path estimates
Using the alternative path model (see Figure 5.6), I obtained the standardized path
estimates for all constructs (see Table 5.14). For the frustrated group, 9 out of 9 paths in
the alternative path model were found statistically significant. Distributive injustice,
interpersonal injustice, informational injustice, and negative affective absorption
explained 35.2% of the variance in negative affective flow. Attitude toward general
information security policy explained 8.7% of the total variance in attitude toward
specific information security policy. Attitude toward specific information security policy
and negative affective flow explained 30.1% of the variance in compliance with
information security policy and 12.8% of the variance in future information security
policy noncompliance intention (see squared multiple correlations in Table 5.14).
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For the not frustrated group, 7 out of 9 paths in the alternative path model were
found to be statistically significant. Distributive injustice, interpersonal injustice,
informational injustice, and negative affective absorption explained 47.6% of the
variance in negative affective flow. Attitude toward specific information security policy
explained 7.5% of the variance in compliance with information security policy. Attitude
toward specific information security policy and negative affective flow explained 23.2%
of the variance in future information security policy noncompliance intention (see
squared multiple correlations in Table 5.14).

Figure 5.6

Alternative path model
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Table 5.14

Path estimates, t-values, and squared multiple correlations

Frustrated Group
Not Frustrated Group
Std. T-Value p-value Std. T-Value p-value
Estimate
Estimate
P2A: ↑DINJ
→
↑NAF
.324
3.625
***
.172
3.070 .002**
P2B: ↑IINJ
→
↑NAF
.256
3.348
***
.388
6.579
***
P2C: ↑FINJ
→
↑NAF
.163
2.046
.041*
.100
2.230
.026*
P3: ↑GATT → ↑SATT .478
3.839
***
-.043
-0.407
n.s.
P4: ↑ SATT → ↑COMP .246
7.880
***
.102
3.457
***
P5:
↑SATT → ↓FINT -.255
-3.642
***
-.361
-6.379
***
P6:
↑NAA
→
↑NAF
.165
2.418
.016*
.116
2.411
.016*
P7:
↑NAF
→ ↓COMP -.067
-2.032 .042*
-.057
-1.479
n.s.
P8:
↑NAF
→ ↑FINT
.224
3.042 .002**
.258
3.508
***
Squared Multiple Correlations
NAF
0.352
0.476
SATT
0.087
0.001
COMP
0.301
0.075
FINT
0.128
0.232
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; DINJ = Perceived Distributive Injustice; PINJ
= Perceived Procedural Injustice; IINJ = Perceived Interpersonal Injustice; FINJ =
Perceived Informational Injustice; NAA = Negative Affective Absorption; NAF =
Negative Affective Flow; GATT = Attitude toward General Information Security Policy;
SATT = Attitude toward Specific Information Security Policy; COMP = Information
Security Policy Compliance; FINT = Future Information Security Policy Noncompliance
Intention
Hypothesized Relationship

Control variables
Accounting for control variables leads to unbiased estimates by removing any
confounding variables. Therefore, information was collected and controlled for the
following variables: gender, age, education, ethnicity, current and expected grade, the
importance of extra credit, and estimated and actual time to complete the experiment. In
structural equation modeling using AMOS 22, a control variable is included by adding a
direct relationship to all the dependent variables in the model. Additionally, a covariance
relationship is added between all independent constructs.
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Structural equation modeling was conducted to determine whether each of the
control variables had an impact on the dependent variables in the model. In the frustrated
group, none of the control variables had an impact on the dependent variables (see Table
5.15). In the not frustrated group, however, the data indicate that gender, age, current
grade, expected grade, the estimated time to complete the experiment, and actual time to
complete the experiment influenced the dependent variables (see Table 5.15). Males
more likely to enter negative affective flow and less likely to comply with information
security policy than females. Additionally, older individuals had a lower attitude toward
specific information security policies. Also, individuals who perceived their grades to be
low had a greater attitude toward specific information security policies and were less
likely to enter negative affective flow; and individuals who expected to earn a lower
grade in the class were less likely to comply with information security policy. In addition,
the results demonstrate that the belief about the length for task completion was positively
associated with increased negative affective flow and decreased future intention to not
comply with information security policy. Finally, the actual length for task completion
was negatively associated with compliance with information security policy.
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Table 5.15

Control variable path estimates

Frustrated Group
Not Frustrated Group
Control Variable
Std.
Std.
T-Value p-value
T-Value p-value
Relationship
Estimate
Estimate
GENDER → NAF
.154
1.191
n.s.
.170
2.224
.026*
GENDER → SATT
.144
0.913
n.s.
-.036
-0.264
n.s.
GENDER → COMP
-.055
-0.854
n.s.
-.159
-3.091
.002**
GENDER → FINT
.105
0.727
n.s.
-.024
-0.236
n.s.
AGE
→
NAF
.002
.194
n.s.
.005
0.335
n.s.
AGE
→
SATT
.019
1.327
n.s.
-.054
-2.231
.026**
AGE
→ COMP
.002
.422
n.s.
.006
0.671
n.s.
AGE
→
FINT
-.018
-1.363
n.s.
-.014
-0.782
n.s.
EDU
→
NAF
.039
0.334
n.s.
.067
1.244
n.s.
EDU
→
SATT
.188
1.321
n.s.
-.118
-1.257
n.s.
EDU
→ COMP
-.055
-0.947
n.s.
.018
0.476
n.s.
EDU
→
FINT
.012
0.092
n.s.
.027
0.380
n.s.
GRADE →
NAF
-.003
-0.065
n.s.
-.079
-2.023
.043*
GRADE →
SATT
.008
0.078
n.s.
.154
2.228
.026*
GRADE → COMP
.003
0.105
n.s.
.049
1.763
n.s.
GRADE →
FINT
-.020
-0.285
n.s.
-.001
-0.014
n.s.
EGRADE→
NAF
-.164
-0.386
n.s.
.113
1.425
n.s.
EGRADE→
SATT
-.053
-0.974
n.s.
-.268
-1.927
n.s.
EGRADE→ COMP
.016
0.232
n.s.
-.192
-3.545
***
EGRADE→
FINT
.113
0.734
n.s.
-.139
-1.302
n.s.
EC
→
NAF
-.024
-0.173
n.s.
.091
1.776
n.s.
EC
→
SATT
-.048
-0.286
n.s.
-.057
-0.607
n.s.
EC
→ COMP
.039
0.567
n.s.
-.026
-0.731
n.s.
EC
→
FINT
.125
0.818
n.s.
-.117
-1.708
n.s.
ESTTIME → NAF
.007
0.760
n.s.
.020
3.133
.002**
ESTTIME → SATT
.019
1.799
n.s.
.015
1.299
n.s.
ESTTIME → COMP
-.008
-1.839
n.s.
-.005
-1.090
n.s.
ESTTIME → FINT
-.010
-1.044
n.s.
-.019
-2.107
.035*
ACTTIME → NAF
.030
1.925
n.s.
.018
1.407
n.s.
ACTTIME → SATT
.028
0.931
n.s.
.043
1.907
n.s.
ACTTIME → COMP
-.007
-0.832
n.s.
-.020
-2.206
.027*
ACTTIME → FINT
-.018
-1.045
n.s.
-.020
-1.139
n.s.
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01; EDU = Education Completed; GRADE = Current Grade;
EGRADE = Expected Grade; EC = Importance of Extra Credit; ESTTIME = Estimated
Time to Complete Experiment; ACTTIME = Actual Time to Complete Experiment; NAF
= Negative Affective Flow; SATT = Attitude toward Specific Information Security
Policy; COMP = Information Security Policy Compliance; FINT = Future Information
Security Policy Compliance Intention
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After including control variables in the model for the not frustrated group, one
proposed hypothesis (i.e. informational injustice leading to negative affective flow) no
longer received support resulting in a change in the variance explained in each construct.
Distributive injustice, procedural injustice, negative affective absorption, gender, and
estimated time to complete the experiment explained 52.1% of the variance in negative
affective flow. Grade and age explained 5.6% of the total variance in attitude toward
specific information security policy. Attitude toward specific information security policy,
actual time to complete the experiment, gender, and expected grade explained 21.3% of
the variance in compliance with information security policy. Attitude toward specific
information security policy, negative affective flow, and estimate time to complete the
experiment explained 23.9% of the variance in future information security policy
noncompliance intention.
Interpretation
Out of ten proposed alternative hypotheses, the results indicate support for all ten
alternative hypotheses in the frustrated group and seven alternative hypotheses in the not
frustrated group after including control variables (see Table 5.16). Figure 5.7 and Figure
5.8 display the proposed alternative model with the parameter estimates, p-values, and
variance explained for both groups. The data indicate that individuals who experience
frustrating tasks are less likely to comply with information security policy (P1). P2A and
P2B were supported, indicating that perceptions of distributive and interpersonal injustice
lead to negative affective flow. Additionally, P2C was partially supported, indicating that
informational injustice influences negative affective flow in the frustrated group. The
results also indicate that, for frustrated individuals, attitude toward general information
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security policy leads to attitude toward specific information security policy (P3). P4 and
P5 are both supported, indicating that attitude toward specific information security policy
leads to information security policy compliance behavior and future information security
policy compliance intention. According to P6, the data confirm that negative affective
absorption leads to negative affective flow. P7 supports that those who are frustrated
experience negative affective flow which reduces information security policy compliance
behavior. Finally, support for P8 indicates that individuals who experience negative
affective flow have future intentions to not comply with information security policy. All
these results are discussed further in this chapter.
Table 5.16

Alternative proposed hypotheses and support

PO Structural Relationship
(ISP = information security policy)
P1 Individuals who are subjected to frustrating tasks are
less likely to comply with ISP.
P2A Perceived distributive injustice is positively related to
negative affective flow.
P2B Perceived interpersonal injustice is positively related to
negative affective flow.
P2C Perceived informational injustice is positively related to
negative affective flow.
P3 Attitude toward general ISP is positively related to
attitude toward specific ISP.
P4 Attitude toward specific ISP is positively related to ISP
compliance.
P5 Attitude toward specific ISP is negatively related to
future ISP noncompliance intention.
P6 Negative affective absorption is positively related to
negative affective flow.
P7 Negative affective flow is negatively related to
compliance with ISP.
P8 Negative affective flow is positively related to future
ISP noncompliance intention.
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Supported?
Not
Frustrated
Frustrated
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Figure 5.7

Alternative model with significant path coefficients (frustrated group)

Figure 5.8

Alternative model with significant path coefficients (not frustrated group)
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Implications for information systems research
Previous information security research focuses on individual compliance with
information security policy, but this research has primarily examined compliance
behavior through cognitive theories including the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen,
1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), rational choice theory (D’Arcy & Herath, 2011;
Paternoster & Pogarsky, 2009; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Westland, 1997),
deterrence theory (D’Arcy & Herath, 2011; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012;
Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001; Onwudiwe et al., 2005; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Straub
& Welke, 1998; Willison & Warkentin, 2013), and neutralization (Pershing, 2003;
Siponen & Vance, 2010; Sykes & Matza, 1957; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). In
addition, prior research has primarily captured information regarding compliance
intentions rather than actual compliance behavior. This research offers additional insight
into information systems security literature by, first, introducing new constructs with
their associated scales: affective absorption and affective flow. Second, studying affective
theories together with cognitive theories grants a holistic understanding regarding
compliance attitudes and behavior. Third, exploring affective theories as a critical and
necessary antecedent to understanding why deterrence mechanisms oftentimes fail.
Finally, capturing actual compliance behavior, rather than compliance intention, leads to
richer and more meaningful findings regarding information security behaviors.
The biggest contribution of this dissertation is the introduction of two additional
constructs, affective absorption and affective flow, and their impact on compliance
behavior. Negative affective absorption is the disposition to experience deep involvement
with negative emotions. According to Weiss and Cropanzano (1996), individuals with
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dispositions to negative affect are likely to have more intense bouts of emotion and react
stronger when negative events occur. The results of this study extend this idea and
indicate that negative affective absorption leads to negative affective flow or a state of
deep involvement with negative emotions. This study demonstrates the need to
distinguish between trait- versus state-like emotions when evaluating information
systems and information security research.
Additionally, organizational injustice has a significant impact on negative
affective flow. Therefore, in answer to the second research question of this dissertation,
individuals who perceive they have experienced distributive injustice (Cohen-Charash &
Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Lim, 2002), interpersonal injustice (Colquitt et al.,
2001), and informational injustice (Colquitt et al., 2001; Shapiro et al., 1994) are more
likely to become deeply involved with their emotions. Additionally, the data confirm that
frustrating tasks lead to negative affective flow. This research demonstrates a more indepth understanding regarding individual emotions and the depths of these emotions.
Understanding the depths of these emotions is critical to understanding
information security behaviors. In response to the third research question presented in
this dissertation, the results provide evidence that the state of negative affective flow
negatively influences information security policy compliance behavior, however, it did
not influence attitude toward specific information security policy. This lack of
significance between negative affective flow and attitude toward specific information
security policy may be because, regardless of an individual’s emotional state, they may
view information security policies to be important; however, their actions “speak louder
than their words” in that they do not comply with these policies based on the feelings
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they are experiencing. Additionally, as indicated in the alternative model, negative
affective flow positively influenced future information security policy noncompliance
intention. This extends information security literature by demonstrating the role of affect
to gain a more holistic understanding regarding information security policy compliance
intentions and actual compliance behavior.
To achieve a more holistic understanding, this study responds to the first research
question presented in this dissertation by demonstrating that affect may have a greater
influence on information security compliance attitudes and behaviors than cognition.
Rooted in affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), this research confirms
that cognitive theories such as organizational injustice may cause affective reactions such
as negative affective flow which may result in devastating effects for an organization. In
the original model, none of the organizational injustice constructs had a direct impact on
attitude toward specific information security policy and compliance with information
security policy, suggesting that affect had a more important role than cognition on
explaining behavior. This study contributes to the information systems discipline by
combining cognitive and affective processes in a unified model to explain compliance
behavior and future information security policy noncompliance intention. Given the
impact of negative affective flow, affect becomes a critical and necessary pre-kinetic
event that should be explored prior to deterrence (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). These
findings offer a new theoretical lens when investigating information security policy
compliance behavior.
Another contribution is the distinction between attitude toward general
information security policy and attitude toward specific information security policy. The
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results indicate that attitude toward general information security policies influences
attitude toward specific information security policies. This indicates that researchers
would be advised to apply attitude to the context of the specific research phenomena they
are exploring.
Furthermore, this study contributes to information systems research by capturing
actual compliance with information security policy in addition to future intention to not
comply with information security policy. Given the measurement issues associated with
collecting only behavioral intention in the context of information security (Crossler et al.,
2013), this study achieves richer and more meaningful findings regarding information
security behaviors through collecting actual compliance behavior.
Implications for information systems practice
According to Benbasat and Zmud (1999), academic research should contribute to
both theory and practice. Therefore, this study provides value to practitioners by (1)
specifying policies and procedures that should be included in security, education,
training, and awareness (SETA) programs, (2) indicating ways to adjust tasks and
procedures (or better explain them) to reduce frustration, (3) specifying the need to
induce positive affect, (4) suggesting ways to control and/or monitor employee levels of
affect, and (5) demonstrating the need for quick response to any noticeable issues.
Security education, training, and awareness programs have proven effective in
motivating individuals to comply with information security policies (Crossler &
Bélanger, 2009; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Puhakainen, 2006; Siponen et al., 2007; Siponen,
2000, 2005; Thomson & von Solms, 1998); however, violations are still a grave concern
for information security management (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Q. Hu et al., 2011). Most of
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these training programs focus on cognitive responses to situations (e.g. neutralization),
which may not be the most effective approach. This research identifies the need to
include training regarding affective responses in addition to cognitive responses. Training
that emphasizes issues that relate to both cognitive and affective processes may provide
individuals with a more in-depth understanding regarding company expectations. During
these training sessions, managers could explain that employees may experience negative
emotions due to their interaction with fellow employees, managers, or existing or new
policies and procedures. Further, managers could explain that it is not acceptable to bottle
up negative emotions, rather they could describe the necessary outlets to address the
emotions they have experienced. Such outlets may include sessions focused on emotional
support, discussions with managers, or anonymous suggestion boxes. These outlets
facilitate idea generation regarding how to effectively reduce further frustration and grant
employees the ability to proactively do something to counter the negative emotions they
experience.
This research also contributes to practice by indicating the need to reduce
frustrating tasks. Similar to trait affect (Russell, 2003; Scherer, 2005), negative affective
absorption is not subject to stimulus, rather it is the stable tendency to become completely
involved with one’s emotions. Given the nature of negative affective absorption, it may
be difficult for organizations to change an individual’s tendency to become absorbed in
his or her negative emotions (i.e. negative affective absorption). Therefore, organizations
can focus on controlling situational experiences that may stimulate negative feelings
which may lead to negative affective flow. An organization may want to consider the
nature of organizational tasks or investigate employee-to-employee or employee-to143

management interactions. Business processes could then be reevaluated to improve
training or remove the issue altogether. Therefore, frustration may be reduced and
employee morale may be increased, essentially countering negative affective flow.
Another contribution of this research is not only to eliminate or better explain
frustrating tasks, but also to increase positive affective experiences. Sheldon and
Lyubomirsky (2006) emphasize that organizations should motivate their employees to
express gratitude and think of their best self (i.e. imagine themselves in the future where
everything has gone as well as possible). For example, employees may imagine that their
individual and lifetime goals have come to fruition. Sheldon and Lyubomirsky (2006)
indicate that this will guide individual decisions right now which may lead to increased
positive affect and life satisfaction. Another study showed that those who watched a war
movie were able to experience positive affect by drawing a happy picture rather than
discussing their negative impressions about the movie (Dalebroux, Goldstein, & Winner,
2008). Similarly, companies could consider programs that alter employee perceptions
about the organization reducing the likelihood that an individual would experience
negative affective flow.
Information technology governance and monitoring has a critical role on
influencing compliance behaviors (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Hovav &
D’Arcy, 2012; Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005; Warkentin & Johnston, 2006,
2008). This study indicates the importance of controlling and/or monitoring employee
levels of affect; therefore, including affect in employee monitoring is critical and
necessary to protect organizational information and assets. Periodically, organizations (or
third-party consultants) may distribute anonymous surveys to their employees to
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determine their propensity to experience negative affective flow. Organizations could
then use the data obtained in these surveys to identify and address any issues prior to
deviant behavior.
Finally, this research demonstrates the need to quickly respond to any noticeable
issues related to perceptions of unfairness. By addressing these issues quickly, negative
affect can be controlled before negative affective flow is experienced. In order to assess
these issues, organizations could focus on training managers to address sensitive issues
with individual employees in a respectable and courteous manner so that employees
understand the repercussions of passions that aren’t controlled. By controlling negative
affective flow, organizations can have a healthier and more secure workplace.
Limitations and future research
The goal of research is to maximize three criteria: generalizability, precision, and
realism (McGrath, 1994). However, attempting to maximize one of these three criteria
results in sacrificing the other criteria (McGrath, 1994). Accordingly, this research is also
not exempt from limitations; however, understanding these limitations can lead to future
research opportunities. Limitations of this study pertain to the theoretical constructs
excluded from the model, the research method used to test the proposed model, and the
sampling frame. Through future research, limitations may be overcome by examining the
impact of additional constructs, conducting research using additional methods, and
collecting data from additional sources. By conducting multi-method research, we can
better maximize the three research criteria.
This study underscores the need for understanding affective processes with
regards to information systems compliance behavior. In order to keep this model
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parsimonious, only a few other factors were explored to better understand compliance
with information security policy. The original model included other pre-kinetic events
and factors in the model; however, through a series of discussions with members on the
dissertation committee, a more parsimonious model was created which could be tested
more easily. Achieving a good balance between completeness and parsimony introduces
theoretical limitations which could be addressed through future research. For example,
examining other constructs such as affective quality, neutralization, risk tolerance, and
time orientation together with affective absorption and affective flow may provide a
deeper understanding regarding individual behaviors.
Affective quality, the ability to change core affect (Russell, 2003), may diminish
an individual’s negative affective absorption which would lead to reduced negative
affective flow. Neutralization theory examines behavioral rationalizations through
various justification techniques to reduce an individual’s view of the consequences
(Sykes & Matza, 1957). Examining neutralization together with the affective constructs
of this study could provide a deeper understanding regarding the impact of cognition
versus affect on information security policy compliance behavior. Risk tolerance refers to
the maximum amount of uncertainty that one is willing to accept (Liang & Xue, 2009)
and by assessing risk tolerance together with affective flow, researchers may achieve a
greater understanding regarding information security policy compliance behavior. Time
orientation looks at the manner that individuals and cultures partition human experiences
into temporal categories of past, present, and future which fluctuate based on learned
preferences (Zimbardo, Keough, & Boyd, 1997). Evaluating time orientation differences
among individuals may offer greater insights with respect to affective flow. For example,
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future time-oriented individuals may be less likely to become immersed in present
negative emotions.
Another limitation of this study is that only negative aspect of affective absorption
and affective flow was investigated. Positive affective absorption and positive affective
flow could also be examined in this and other research contexts. Gottman (1994) found
successful marriages maintain a 5:1 ratio of positive-to-negative interactions; whereas,
marriages that ended in divorce have closer to a 1:1 ratio of positive-to-negative
interactions. Additionally, bad events have a stronger impact than good events and take
longer to wear off (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). These statistics
can easily be adapted to a business context; accordingly, increasing the number of
positive experiences or replacing negative experiences with positive experiences could
result in a successful relationship between employees and businesses. This focus could
result in a net positive experience, in other words, positive interactions would offset any
negative interactions individuals experience in the organization or with a specific
technology (Etherington, 2013). Future research could explore the impact of these
experiences on both positive and negative affective flow which may provide increased
understanding regarding attitude toward information security policy and information
security policy compliance behavior.
Additionally, affective absorption and affective flow could be applied to
additional phenomena such as information systems use to determine their impact in other
contexts. Although affective absorption was applied in a security context, this research
could be applied throughout many aspects of information systems research. For example,
affective absorption and affective flow may be included in the taxonomy of affective
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concepts as identified by Zhang (2013). Affective absorption may be indicative of other
constructs such as satisfaction, usefulness, ease of use, etc. in addition to beliefs,
attitudes, and behaviors. Through future studies on affective absorption and affective
flow, we may gain greater insight regarding additional factors that lead individuals to
become completely immersed in their emotions which ultimately affects information
security policy compliance behavior.
This study utilized an experiment to establish greater precision through the
control of extraneous variables. From a methodological standpoint, research that focuses
on measurement precision (e.g. this study) are limited in their results as to realism and
generalizability (McGrath, 1994). Although the goal is to maximize these three criteria,
by focusing on one criterion we may reduce the other two criteria (McGrath, 1994).
Hence, a single study using a single strategy is inherently flawed and researchers have
emphasized the need for mixed-method research (McGrath, 1994; Mingers, 2001; V.
Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013). Therefore, limitations from one study could be
addressed in future studies. Related to this dissertation, generalizability could be
increased by conducting self-reported surveys to quickly gather information across
multiple organizations. Utilizing scenarios could increase generalizability when each of
these different scenarios consistently predicts the dependent variable (Siponen & Vance,
2013). These scenarios may also improve realism (Jasso, 2006); however, in order to
maximize realism, qualitative studies conducted using in-depth interviews could motivate
theories which could be tested quantitatively. Future research could incorporate mixedmethods in data collection, or retest this same phenomena using a different method, in
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order to maximize additional criteria when examining affective and cognitive processes
as they relate to information security policy compliance behavior.
Self-reported attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs are subject to bias; therefore,
additional research could explore alternative methods to capture actual levels of affect.
Future studies could use galvanic skin response to measure skin conductance caused by
sweat, electroencephalography (EEG) devices to record brain activity, or thermal cameras
to determine blood rush.
This study used a cross-sectional design that captured the phenomenon of interest
over a brief moment. Drawing conclusions about causal implications of the relationships
observed is difficult without separating the hypothesized causes from effects using a
longitudinal study (Compeau et al., 1999; A. Venkatesh & Vitalari, 1991). Therefore,
future research could explore this same phenomenon using a longitudinal study. For
example, an app could be created and deployed on smartphones of organizational
employees with the intent to capture levels of affect periodically. Research could then
evaluate individual experiences and resulting levels of affect. This study could then
determine how negative affective flow changes over time and if negative affective
absorption can, in fact, be changed.
Another limitation of this study was the use of students as the sampling frame.
Given the nature of the experiment, using students was appropriate given that they are
subject to emotions and have knowledge about information security policies; however, an
alternative sampling frame may increase the generalizability of this study. For example, a
sample that has a more diverse age would allow greater generalizability. Since security
policy of an enterprise depends on the prevalent organizational culture (Dhillon, 1999),
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applying this research to an organizational setting seems to be appropriate. Additionally,
ethnic groups may have different cultural values that may or may not be espoused on the
individual (Hofstede, 1983, 1985; Srite & Karahanna, 2006). Espoused cultural values
may influence information security policy compliance behavior. Therefore, conducting a
cross-cultural study may indicate additional factors that lead to negative affective flow.
Conclusion
Violations of information security policies are a grave concern for information
security management (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Q. Hu et al., 2011). Research has focused on
identifying why individuals do not comply with information security policy; however, the
majority of this research falls short in two ways: (1) the main focus of these studies is on
information security policy compliance intention instead of actual information security
policy compliance behavior and (2) prior literature has predominantly examined the
impact of cognitive processes, rather than affective processes, on information security
policy compliance behavior. Through understanding both affective processes and
cognitive processes in decision making, we gain a more holistic approach to why
individuals engage in deviant behavior.
Derived from information security and social psychology, this dissertation
examined the impact of unfairness (i.e. organizational injustice) and deep involvement
with one’s emotions (i.e. affective flow) on attitude toward and compliance with
information security policies. The results indicate that individual perceptions of
unfairness lead people to become completely involved with their negative emotions.
Additionally, people who are immersed in their negative emotions are less likely to
comply with information security policy. Finally, the results demonstrate that individuals
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who experience negative affective flow have increased future information security policy
noncompliance intentions.
These findings contribute to information systems security literature by
introducing two new constructs, affective absorption and affective flow, which increase
understanding regarding information security policy compliance behavior. In addition,
this dissertation demonstrates the need to capture actual behavior rather than only attitude
and intentions. The findings convey how important it is that organizations discuss
emotions in security, education, training, and awareness programs. Additionally,
organizations should focus on eliminating frustrating tasks or reducing frustration caused
by these tasks. Finally, organizations should strive to induce positive affect by evaluating
employee affect levels, identifying areas that need correction, and quickly responding to
issues prior to deviance or noncompliance.
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Figure A.1

Laboratory experiment flow

Introduction
Organizations are increasingly concerned about protecting company information.
Therefore, they have established necessary safeguards (such as information security
policies and procedures) to inform employees of organizational expectations and
consequences. Policy compliance is vital to protecting organizational information.
In order for us to better understand ISP compliance, we ask that you participate in this
study. If you participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a laboratory
experiment that will take about 20-30 minutes to complete. The laboratory experiment
involves a series of supply and demand tasks.
Please understand that your participation is voluntary. Your refusal to participate will
involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may
discontinue your participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits. Through
the duration of the study, your name and netID will be collected in order to register you
for a lab time and award you extra credit upon the completion of the laboratory
experiment.
Participating in this research may lead to heightened understanding about the importance
of information security policies. In order to be rewarded extra credit you must complete
the laboratory experiment.
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Section 1: Recruitment survey
Laboratory registration
Please provide the following information to register for the laboratory experiment.
1.
2.
3.
4.

First Name:
Last Name:
Net ID (e.g. abc123):
Time slot:
[drop down including available time slots]

Please indicate the degree to which you agree with each statement (1 = strongly disagree,
2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 = strongly agree). Please note that while some
of these questions are similar to each other, each question has a specific purpose. Thus,
please pay careful attention to each question.
Attitude toward general information security policy
1. Complying with the requirements of an information security policy
is important (GATT1).
2. Complying with the requirements of an information security policy
is beneficial (GATT2).
3. Complying with the requirements of an information security policy
is helpful (GATT3).
4. Complying with the requirements of an information security policy
is necessary (GATT4).

1 2 3 4 5

Negative affective absorption
5. In general, I lose track of time when I experience negative
emotions (NAA1).
6. In general, negative emotions occupy my attention (NAA2).
7. In general, it is hard for me to focus on something other than my
negative emotions (NAA3).
8. In general, I become deeply involved with my negative emotions
(NAA4).
9. In general, I have no control over my negative emotions (NAA5).
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1 2 3 4 5

Demographics
Please answer the following demographic information. This demographic information
will not be used to identify respondents.
10. Grade: To the best of
your knowledge,
what is your current
grade in the class?
11. Expected Grade:
What grade do you
expect to earn in
class?
12. Extra credit: How
important is earning
extra credit to you?
13. Gender: What is
your gender?
14. Age: Please select
your age.
15. Education: What is
the highest level of
education you have
completed?
16. Ethnicity: What is
your ethnicity?

A
B
C
D
F
A
B
C
D
F
Not important
Somewhat important
Moderately important
Important
Very important
Male
Female
18-100
High school
Associate’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree
Doctorate/professional degree
Other
American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian
Black or African American
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
White
Section 2: File download instructions

Please visit the following URL: [insert download location]. An Excel document will be
downloaded to your computer. Save the file to your desktop or some other location and
then open it.
When you open the document, your document may open in protected view. If it opens in
protected view, please click “Enable Editing.” Similarly, you may see a security warning
that macros have been disabled. Please “Enable Content” in order to begin the simulation.
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If you run into errors, please close and reopen the document. When everyone is ready, I
will begin a video presentation that describes the laboratory experiment.
Section 3: Video presentation & laboratory experiment
The purpose of this video presentation is to describe the task you are about to complete.
After opening the Excel document, a pop-up message appears asking you to enter your
user ID (See Figure A.2). Please enter the three digit number you were provided when
you entered the lab.

Figure A.2

User ID input dialog

After entering your user ID, you will see a production simulation. In this simulation, you
play the role of a production manager for a new company product. In order to protect
company information, organizations establish information security policies and
procedures to inform employees of organizational expectations and consequences.
Password guidelines are included as part of these policies which state that users should
never share passwords with others. Therefore, you are expected to keep your password
secret.
As a production manager, you are required to determine how many units to produce each
month in order to meet demand. In addition to meeting the expected demand, your
company wants you to maintain an additional 325 units in inventory. You will complete
20 decisions in this simulation.
This table (Figure A.3) shows your production information. Your decision # shows you
the decision you are currently on. Your current inventory displays how much you have in
storage; this number begins at 0, but ideally you want to keep it at 325. The following
three rows show you the expected demand for the current month, the next month, and in
two months. Use this information to help you make a decision; enter your decision in the
yellow box here and then click “Submit.” Repeat this process for 20 decisions.
Since you will need to make 20 decisions, I will demonstrate one decision. First, we look
at the expected demand for the current month and add enough production units to
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maintain 325 units of current inventory. Next, enter a value based on the summation of
these two values. For example, let’s try 2850 units and click “Submit.”
After each decision, you will receive immediate feedback (see Figure A.4). You will see
your decision and how it compares to the actual required production needed. A percent
error is calculated based on the difference and a reward is given. Ten reward points are
given if your percent error is in the green range (less than 10% error), five reward points
if it is in the yellow range (greater than or equal to 10% error but less than 25% error),
and zero reward points if it is in the red range (greater than or equal to 25% error).

Figure A.3

Production information screenshot
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Figure A.4

Decision history screenshot

Note that the reward points earned in this simulation determine how much extra credit
you will receive at the end (i.e. percentage of total extra credit is determined as a
percentage of total possible points earned in the experiment). Use this information to help
you make better decisions.
If you forget anything that was described in the demo, these two cells (see Figure A.5)
serve as a summary on how to make a decision and what the decision history means.
Now, go ahead and make your decisions. Good luck!

Figure A.5

Instruction summary

Section 4: Information security policy compliance
A coworker has offered to help you select the appropriate supply to meet expected
demand. However, in order to receive help from your coworker, you will need to share
your password.
If you want to receive help from your coworker, please enter your password and click the
"OK" button. Otherwise, please click the "Cancel" button.
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Section 5: Final survey
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with each statement (1 = strongly disagree,
2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 = strongly agree). Please note that while some
of these questions are similar to each other, each question has a specific purpose. Thus,
please pay careful attention to each question.
Attitude toward specific information security policy
17. In this exercise, it was important that I not share my password
(SATT1).
18. In this exercise, it was critical that I not share my password
(SATT2).
19. In this exercise, it was essential that I not share my password
(SATT3).
20. In this exercise, it was necessary that I not share my password
(SATT4).

1 2 3 4 5

Negative affective flow
21. During this exercise, I lost track of time due to my negative
emotions (NAF1).
22. During this exercise, negative emotions occupied my attention
(NAF2).
23. During this exercise, it was hard to focus on something other than
the negative emotions I experienced (NAF3).
24. During this exercise, I became deeply involved with negative
emotions (NAF4).
25. During this exercise, I had no control over my negative emotions
(NAF5).

1 2 3 4 5

Perceived distributive injustice
26. Based on the effort I put into this exercise, the amount of extra
credit I received was unfair (DINJ1).
27. Based on the instructions I was given during this exercise, the
amount of extra credit I received was unfair (DINJ2).
28. Based on the decisions I completed during this exercise, the amount
of extra credit I received was unfair (DINJ3).
29. Based on the stress I experienced during this exercise, the amount
of extra credit I received was unfair (DINJ4).
30. Based on the training provided during the exercise, the amount of
extra credit I received was unfair (DINJ5).
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1 2 3 4 5

Perceived procedural injustice
31. The decision process of this exercise was unreasonable (PINJ1).
32. The decision process of this exercise was inconsistent (PINJ2).
33. The decision process of this exercise was unfair (PINJ3).
34. The decision process of this exercise was flawed (PINJ4).
35. The decision process of this exercise was rigged (PINJ5).

1 2 3 4 5

Perceived informational injustice
36. The video presentation did not explain this exercise thoroughly
(FINJ1).
37. The video presentation explanations regarding this exercise were
unreasonable (FINJ2).
38. The experimental instructions were conveyed using a method I do
not prefer (FINJ3).
39. The video presentation did not sufficiently provide detailed
instructions about the exercise (FINJ4).

1 2 3 4 5

Perceived interpersonal injustice
40. During the exercise, I was not treated in a polite manner (IINJ1).
41. During the exercise, I was not treated with dignity (IINJ2).
42. During the exercise, I was not treated with respect (IINJ3).

1 2 3 4 5

Please consider your experience in the previous exercise and indicate the degree to which
you agree with each statement (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree,
and 5 = strongly agree). Please note that while some of these questions are similar to each
other, each question has a specific purpose. Thus, please pay careful attention to each
question.
Future information security policy compliance intention
43. If I experienced a similar situation as this exercise in a workplace
environment, I am certain I would reveal my password (FINT1).
44. If I experienced a similar situation as this exercise in a workplace
environment, I expect I would share my password (FINT2).
45. If I experienced a similar situation as this exercise in a workplace
environment, I am likely to disclose my password (FINT3).
46. If I experienced a similar situation as this exercise in a workplace
environment, I predict I would divulge my password (FINT4).
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1 2 3 4 5

Please answer the following questions.
Completion Time and Frustration Level
47. Without looking at the clock, please indicate how much
time you think it took to complete all ten decisions.
48. Please indicate how irritated this exercise made you.

49. Previously, you indicated that you were [frustration
level] during this exercise. Please describe why this
exercise you were [frustration level]?

Minutes
Not irritated at all
Somewhat irritated
Moderately irritated
Very irritated
Extremely irritated

Section 6: Debrief
Thank you for your participation in the experiment. You will not be required to complete
the remaining 10 decisions. Also, despite that the experiment indicated previously that
the total extra credit you earned was determined on your success, you will be rewarded
full extra credit for your participation.
Please check the following box indicating that you promise not to disclose this
experiment to others.
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